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EU law as an agent of national constitutional change: 
Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
Gavin Phillipson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It may be considered ironic that the first – and perhaps only - use of Article 50 TEU, 
which allows a Member State to decide to withdraw from the EU ‘in accordance with its 
own constitutional requirements’,1 should have been by the United Kingdom, the only state 
in the EU without a formal Constitution, from which those ‘requirements’ might have been 
gleaned. The case of Miller v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union,2consisted of 
an extended argument over just what those requirements were. This lead to a classic 
constitutional dispute concerning the application of principles such as separation of powers, 
rule of law and the hierarchical ranking of different sources of legal power within the 
constitution. Feeding into all of these questions was the overarching issue of the nature of 
EU law as it operates within – and changes – a national legal order.  Paul Craig has observed 
that ‘The decision to exit the EU ranks among the most important, if not the most 
important, peace time treaty decision…made by the UK’.3 The question of how that decision 
                                                          
* Professor of Law, Durham University, UK. Earlier versions of this paper were given at a 
seminar at theWalter-Hallstein Institut, Humboldt University, Berlin, a Modern Law Review 
Symposium at the LSE, a seminar at UCD Law School and in a panel at the ICON-S Annual 
Meeting in Copenhagen. The author is particularly grateful for the Chairs of these sessions, 
and for helpful comments and suggestions made by participants at ICON-S, especially those 
by Grianne de Burca, Jeff King, Eoin Carolan and Timothy Endicott. Many thanks also to 
Robert Craig, Alison Young and Tom Hickman for very helpful comments on an earlier draft 
of this article. The usual disclaimer applies. For ease of reference the author refers to ‘the 
EU’ and ‘EU law’ throughout, even when discussing the EEC or EC law and always to ‘the 
CJEU’. All posts cited on UK Const L. Blog cited are available at available at 
https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/. All websites were last visited on 16 August 2017. 
1 Article 50(1) of the Treaty on European Union, inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon. See below 
at 000 for further provisions of Article 50.  
2 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] 
UKSC 5; [2017] 2 W.L.R. 583 (hereafter ‘Miller’). 
3 Paul Craig, ‘Miller, Structural Constitutional Review and the Limits of Prerogative Power’ 
(2017) Public Law at 000 [page cites to be inserted at proof stage].  
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could be lawfully made and notified therefore assumed enormous importance in what was 
swiftly dubbed ‘the constitutional case of the century’4 – one that attracted media coverage 
unprecedented in its scale and intensity.5   
While argument in Miller became at times extremely intricate, the core contention 
of the claimants was simple: they argued that the Government lacked legal power under 
that residual source of executive power known as the royal prerogative6 to commence 
withdrawal from the EU. If they were right about that, then the only way for the 
Government to obtain that legal power was through legislation – an Act of Parliament. This 
may make it sound as if Miller concerned a purely ‘internal’ British constitutional law 
argument, of little interest perhaps to scholars from other states.7  But while it did concern 
questions of domestic constitutional law it also raised two issues of more general interest. 
First, a key controversy in the case as it was argued and decided in the Supreme Court 
concerned the nature and role of EU law in the national constitutional order – in particular 
whether EU law should be characterised as transforming, or as tightly controlled by, the 
domestic constitutional order. The second issue of interest to states that, like the UK, follow 
the dualist, rather than the monist tradition, is this: where a statute has given some 
domestic effect to rights and/or obligations flowing from an international treaty, does the 
Executive remain competent to exercise its ordinary power to withdraw from the treaty, 
                                                          
4 A phrase used by many commentators, including UCL’s respected Constitution Unit: 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/constitution-unit/constitution-unit-events/brexit-in-supreme-court 
5 The BBC carried unprecedented rolling live coverage of and commentary on the hearing 
and judgment; there was widespread coverage across the print and online media 
worldwide.  
6  This may be briefly defined as the residual, non-statutory and uncodified powers of the 
Crown, exercised in modern times by Government Ministers on behalf of the Monarch. 
There is no authoritative text of the prerogative (save insofar as discrete aspects of it are 
identified in court judgments): its origins lie in custom and history.  
7 Miller also dealt with important questions concerning the role of the devolved institutions 
of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the decision to leave the EU. For reasons of 
space and the concerns of this journal those aspect of the case are not considered here; for 
analysis, see Jo Murkens, ‘Mixed Messages in Bottles: the European Union, devolution, and 
the future of the constitution’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 685, 690-94. The referendum held in 2016 
that resulted in a vote in favour of leaving the UK leaving the EU is also not considered in 
this article, because it did not form an important part of the legal arguments in the case. Its 
broader significance is considered further by the author in G. Phillipson, ‘The Brexit case: 
why did political constitutionalists support the Government side’? (2018) Queensland LR 
(forthcoming).   
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even where that would in some way affect domestic law? That this is not a question purely 
of concern to the UK may be seen from cases from South Africa concerning withdrawal from 
the International Criminal Court 8  and from Canada concerning the Government’s 
withdrawal from the Kyoto climate change agreement despite the existence of a domestic 
implementing statute.9  
There were two aspects of the Supreme Court’s judgment that appeared novel and 
which have already aroused controversy. It claimed first that the effect of the domestic 
implementation of EU law was such as to render it an ‘entirely new, independent and 
overriding source of domestic law’.10 Second the Court argued that cutting off this source of 
EU law by terminating membership would amount to a ‘far-reaching change to the UK’s 
constitutional arrangements’ and that it would be contrary to ‘long-standing and 
fundamental principle’ for such a far-reaching constitutional change to be brought about by 
the Executive without express legislative authorisation.11  
Mark Elliott has accused the Supreme Court of self-contradiction by asserting that 
EU law is both an independent source of law but one that only has effect through an existing 
source – UK statute; he has also castigated the ‘constitutional change’ argument as 
unacceptably uncertain and lacking both authority and clear normative foundations.12 This 
piece will seek to show that both these arguments are defensible, albeit with some 
‘finessing’.13 In relation to the ‘source of law’ argument it will be contended that the 
Supreme Court was seeking to chart a path that respected the core UK tradition of 
parliamentary sovereignty while taking a realistic, historical view of the role and significance 
of EU law in the domestic order. As such its stance will be argued to be readily 
understandable, provided one can pick one’s way past the semantic imprecision apparent in 
the judgment’s discussion of technical jurisprudential concepts. Such imprecision is made 
more understandable if it is appreciated that the judgment was written in a way intended to 
                                                          
8 Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations et al, Case No: 83145/2016, High 
Court of South Africa, 22 February 2017. 
9 Turp v. Canada (Minister of Justice) et al, 2012, FC 893. 
10 Miller, [80]  
11 Ibid, [81] and [82]. 
12 Mark Elliott ‘The Supreme Court’s Judgment in Miller: In Search of Constitutional 
Principle’ (2017) 76(2)CLJ 257-88.  
13 Tom Poole, ‘Devotion to Legalism: On the Brexit Case’ (2017) 80(4) MLR 696, 703.  
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make it accessible to the general audience that had shown such huge interest in the case. It 
will then be suggested that the ‘constitutional change’ argument may be best understood 
not as a free-standing and novel principle but as a way of emphasising the sheer scale of 
legal change involved in leaving the EU. It is also intimately connected with the ‘source of 
law’ point. While, contrary to the views of one commentator,14the Supreme Court does not 
endorse the CJEU’s vision of the comprehensive supremacy of EU law over national law, it 
does give eloquent expression to the deep transformative effect of EU law in the UK legal 
systems and invites us to accept the proposition that reversal of this effect by withdrawal 
would amount to a major constitutional change that cannot be brought about by the 
Executive acting alone.  
 In what follows, the basic legal arguments in Miller are first sketched out, and a brief 
summary of the relevant judgments given. The article then goes on to analyse the central 
argument advanced by the Government in the Supreme Court, drawn from academic 
commentary on the case: that the domestic status of EU law was always intended to be 
conditional upon Executive determination over whether the UK became and remained a 
member of the EU. It then moves on to explain and evaluate the two arguments advanced 
by the Supreme Court that, as outlined above, have aroused particular controversy. In doing 
so, the analysis links the ‘constitutional change’ argument with recent developments in UK 
constitutional law in which courts have begun to isolate and defend fundamental 
constitutional rights and principles. It will suggest that rather than being seen as an example 
of the ‘inchoate instinctualism’15 that Elliott condemns in the majority judgment, this 
principle can be seen as simply a further, modest step in this ongoing judicial project.  
II. THE BASIC ISSUE IN MILLER AND A SUMMARY OF THE JUDGMENTS 
 
The arguments in Miller rested upon a key assumption about the effect and operation of 
Article 50 It is therefore important to set out the key relevant parts of that provision, which 
are found in the first three paragraphs.  
1) Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its 
own constitutional requirements. 
                                                          
14 Murkens, note 7 above.  
15 Elliott, note 12 above, 288.  
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(2) A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of 
its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the 
Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State…  
(3) The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry 
into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the 
notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement 
with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period. 
 
Crucially, it was accepted for the purposes of the litigation that notice given under Article 50 
cannot be unilaterally revoked: hence the giving of notice was seen as leading inevitably to 
the loss of at least some EU law rights.16  
Since Article, as part of the Treaty of the European Union, applies to all 28 member 
states it could not determine the question of which arm of government within any given 
state can properly trigger it or under what process. The answer to that question may vary as 
between the different Member States of the EU. Hence the key stipulation in paragraph 1 
that the withdrawal decision is to be done ‘in accordance with [each state’s] own 
constitutional requirements’.17 Answering this question within the UK constitutional order 
gave rise to the dilemma that became the core issue in Miller, one raised by the apparent 
clash of two basic principles. The first is that the Executive branch has the undoubted 
general power under the royal prerogative to negotiate, enter into and withdraw from 
                                                          
16 This is a reading of Article 50 which is strongly contested. See e.g. P. P. Craig, ‘Brexit: a 
drama in six acts’ (2006) ELR 447, 463-466. For further discussion of Article 50 see A. 
Tatham, ‘“Don’t Mention 
Divorce at the Wedding, Darling!” EU Accession and Withdrawal after Lisbon’ in A. Biondi et 
al (eds) EU Law after Lisbon (Oxford: OUP, 2012) 128; J. Herbst, ‘Observations on the Right 
to Withdraw from the European Union: Who are the “Masters of the Treaties”’? (2005) 6 
GLJ 1755; H. Hofmeister, ‘“Should I Stay or Should I Go?”—A Critical Analysis of the Right to 
Withdraw From the EU’ (2010) 16 ELJ 589; A. Lazowski, ‘Withdrawal from the European 
Union and Alternatives to Membership’ (2012) 37 EL Rev 523, 527; C. Hillion, ‘Accession and 
Withdrawal in the Law of the European Union’ in A. Arnull and D. Chalmers (eds) Oxford 
Handbook of European Law (Oxford: OUP, 2015) 139; A. Wyrozumska ‘Withdrawal from the 
Union’ in H. J. Blanke and S. Mangiameli (eds) The European Union after Lisbon (Springer, 
2012); see also “The Process of Withdrawing from the European Union” (HL 138; 2015–16).   
17 The decision of the Court of Appeal in Shindler v Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster 
[2016] EWCA Civ 419 confirmed this as the correct reading of Article 50(1) – EU law was held 
not to be relevant to its interpretation. The German Constitutional Court made a like finding 
in Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, Re [2010] 3 CMLR 13, [305-306], cited in Shindler 
(ibid), [7].   
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treaties. As case law has recently confirmed, ‘Ratification of a treaty is, as a matter of 
domestic law, an executive act within the prerogative power of the Crown’,18 a finding 
confirmed by numerous decisions including that of the House of Lords in Rayner (Mincing 
Lane).19  
However, precisely because the UK is a dualist system, the ability to change the UK’s 
obligations in international law carries with it a corollary that became the second principle 
in play: that the exercise of this power does not extend to altering domestic law, frustrating 
the purpose of any statute or removing rights enjoyed in domestic law. The key controversy 
in Miller arose from the fact that EU law has domestic effect in Member States - in the UK 
via the European Communities Act 1972 (hereafter ‘ECA’) - thus giving rise to an important 
set of rights enforceable in domestic law. This led to the key argument raised by the 
claimant Gina Miller in the case,20 based on a general principle of constitutional law well 
summarised by the House of Lords in Rayner: 
the Royal Prerogative, whilst it embraces the making of treaties, does not extend to 
altering the law or conferring rights upon individuals or depriving individuals of rights 
which they enjoy in domestic law without the intervention of Parliament.21 
Since the ECA gives domestic effect to the various rights guaranteed to citizens of the 
Member States by EU law, triggering the Article 50 process will, it was argued, inevitably 
result in the loss of some or all of those rights and the frustration of the core purpose of the 
ECA. Hence, only specific legislation may authorise that process. This basic argument was 
                                                          
18 R (on the application of Wheeler) v Office of the Prime Minister [2008] EWHC 1409 
(Admin), at 
 [15]). 
19 JH Rayner (Mincing Lane Ltd) v DTI [1990] 2 AC 418, 500.  
20 The legal background to the litigation is explained more fully by Robert Craig: ‘Casting 
Aside Clanking Medieval Chains: Prerogative, Statute and Article 50 after the EU 
Referendum’ (2016) 79(6) MLR  1041 
21 n 19 above, 500.   
7 
 
first set out by Jeff King, Nick Barber and Tom Hickman in an extraordinarily prescient and 
influential blogpost.22  
In order to understand the arguments surrounding the construction of the ECA 
canvassed in Miller it is necessary to understand the structure and effect of that statute, 
which has three key provisions for present purposes. First, section 2(1) provides: 
All such rights, powers, liabilities, obligations and restrictions from time to time 
created or arising by or under the Treaties, and all such remedies and procedures 
from time to time provided for by or under the Treaties, as in accordance with the 
Treaties are without further enactment to be given legal effect or used in the United 
Kingdom shall be recognised and available in law. 
 
In essence, this provision makes available in domestic law such of those rights, obligations, 
remedies, etc as are, under EU law, ‘to be given legal effect or used in’ domestic law without 
the need for further enactment. That is, it makes ‘directly effective’ EU law available in UK 
law, in accordance with what EU law itself requires.23 Section 2(4), discussed below, seeks to 
give priority to EU law over both prior and subsequent statutes. Finally, section 3(1) 
provides for questions as to the meaning and effect of EU law to be made in accordance 
with principles laid down by the CJEU or, if necessary referred to it, for determination,24 
thus rendering decisions of the CJEU binding on UK courts.  Finally, the Treaties themselves 
are listed in section 1(1) of the Act and new Treaties have been added to section 1 by way of 
amendment effected by primary legislation.  
  
A. The finding of the Divisional Court25 
The Divisional Court saw itself as upholding two fundamental pillars of the 
‘unwritten’ British constitution – the rule of law and parliamentary sovereignty. 
                                                          
22‘Pulling the Article 50 “Trigger”: Parliament’s Indispensable Role’, U.K. Const. L. Blog (27th 
Jun 2016). Tom Hickman was subsequently instructed as one of the Counsel for the lead 
claimant.  
23 Section 2(2), which is not particularly relevant to Miller, provides for the making of 
secondary legislation to implement EU law: it has been commonly used for the 
implementation of Directives. Such legislation will remain in effect following Brexit and thus 
does not raise constitutional problems re use of the prerogative to initiate exit.  
24 As described in Miller, at [21]. 
25 R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768, [2017] 1 
All E.R. 158.  
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Parliamentary sovereignty means, at its simplest, that Acts of Parliament rank higher than 
other sources of law within the constitution, including the residual prerogative powers of 
the Crown. That is why prerogative powers may be replaced by legislation26 and why the 
Executive cannot use the prerogative to take away rights parliament has put into law – or 
render nugatory a provision of an Act of Parliament. In applying these principles, the High 
Court was at pains to trace the subordination of the Royal Prerogative to Parliament all the 
way back to the great 17th century historical struggles between King and Parliament that 
resulted in the English Civil War and the Glorious Revolution. That revolution was crowned 
by the 1689 Bill of Rights, Article 1 of which states, in words that were quoted and applied 
by the High Court: 'The pretended Power of Suspending of Laws by Regall Authority without 
Consent of Parlyament is illegall’ – a key early articulation of a core rule-of-law principle. 
The view of the Divisional Court was clear – that the triggering of Article 50 via the 
prerogative would set in train a sequence of events that would result in the certain loss of at 
least some EU law rights and the frustration of the European Communities Act, whose effect 
would be ‘switched off’, rendering it a dead letter. As such, use of the prerogative to trigger 
Article 50 would be unlawful.   
There were a number of arguments run by the Government in the High Court that 
did not re-appear on appeal, so decisively were they rejected. These included the so-called 
‘sequencing’ argument - that Government and Parliament would act together in an 
appropriate sequence of events such that Parliament would amend or repeal the ECA as 
necessary before withdrawal came into effect. There was also the ‘uncertain outcome 
argument’: that triggering Article 50 does not itself remove any EU-law rights and that it is 
unknown at this point what rights if any will be removed27 (with it remaining possible that 
none will be if the process is revoked).28 All these arguments were roundly dismissed by the 
Divisional Court. The ‘sequencing’ argument was met with the simple but effective rejoinder 
                                                          
26 As established in the early decision of Attorney General v De Keyser’s Hotel [1920] AC 508, 
540 (HL) – a principle dubbed ‘abeyance’ in the influential analysis of Robert Craig, note 20 
above.   
27 An argument that succeeded in parallel litigation launched in Northern Ireland, in which 
the court said that triggering Article 50 in itself altered nothing in domestic law and 
removed no-one’s rights: Re McCord, Judicial Review [2016] NIQB 85.  
28 Paul Craig, amongst others, has argued that Article 50 should be read as revocable: note 
16 above, 463-466.  
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that the Government cannot defend a course of action that would be unlawful as things 
stand with the plea that Parliament will later enact legislation that will cure or avoid the 
illegality. The Government’s own concession that Article 50 was not revocable killed the 
‘uncertain outcome’ argument, especially when coupled with an argument advanced by 
Dominic Chambers QC for the second claimant that there was a category of rights (known as 
‘category 3 rights’) that would inevitably be lost whatever form UK withdrawal took,29 
including notably the right to stand and vote in elections to the European Parliament.30  
By the time the matter came to the Supreme Court, the Government, 
comprehensively defeated in the Divisional Court, had re-tooled, formulating a set of more 
sophisticated arguments that drew heavily on academic commentary, in particular that 
published by John Finnis, a notable legal philosopher and constitutional theorist, and Mark 
Elliott, one of the UK’s leading public lawyers.31 It persisted with an argument that this 
author termed ‘the argument from parliamentary omission’32 – that as Lloyd LJ had 
observed in an earlier case,33 ‘when Parliament wishes to fetter the Crown's treaty-making 
power in relation to [EU] law, it does so in express terms.’ It was pointed out that there was 
no explicit restriction in any EU-related legislation on use of the prerogative so as to place 
the withdrawal power into abeyance.  
In this regard, it was seen as significant that there is a sequence of UK statutes from 
1978 on in which Parliament placed various restrictions on the ability of the Executive, 
                                                          
29 The first category was those rights that would be lost but which could be converted into 
purely domestic law rights (e.g. certain employment law rights); the second was those that 
could only be replaced with the agreement of other states – e.g. free movement rights. The 
loss of EU-law rights is explicitly conceded by the Government’s case on appeal: below note 
63 at 62[a]. 
30 Guaranteed under the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002; see further below 000-
000. It was the seminal blogpost by King, Barber and Hickman that first highlighted the 
significance of this Act: note 22 above.  
31 As Tom Poole observes: ‘With the aid of extensive academic commentary, the argument 
on prerogative had been polished to a fine sheen in the gap between High Court and 
Supreme Court proceedings’: note 13 above, 699.  
32 In an article written before Miller was first argued: Gavin Phillipson, “A Dive into Deep 
Constitutional Waters: Article 50, the Prerogative and Parliament”, [2016] MLR 70(6) 1064, 
1087.  
33 R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p Rees-Mogg [1994] QB 
552, 567. 
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acting through the prerogative, to agree particular amendments to the Treaties with the 
other Member States without specific parliamentary authorisation.34 Thus the absence of 
any provision in any of these statutes requiring specific parliamentary authorisation for a 
withdrawal decision – especially those passed after the Treaty of Lisbon introduced the 
explicit right of exit in Article 50 - was said to lead to an inference that Parliament had not 
intended any restriction.35 Finnis took this further in noting that in enacting the ECA itself 
and subsequent legislation, the UK Parliament ‘has rigorously abstained from enacting that 
we are to be or are members of the European Communities or Union or parties to their 
Treaties’.36 No statute stated, in terms, ‘the UK shall be a member of the EU’; had it done so 
                                                          
34 Thus section 6 of the European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978 provided that the 
Government could not ratify any treaty that increased the power of the European 
Parliament, unless that treaty had been ratified by Act of Parliament. This was reproduced in 
section 12 of the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002. Subsequently, the 2008 
European Union (Amendment) Act, which gave statutory recognition to the Lisbon Treaty, 
and thus Article 50, sets out in section 6 a list of various, specific EU-related actions that not 
to be taken by Ministers without specific authorisation from Parliament: it does not include 
the triggering of Article 50 as one of them. The 2011 Act set out a number of matters 
(essentially agreeing to extensions of the powers or competencies of the EU) that would 
additionally require the approval in a referendum (the so-called ‘referendum locks’). Once 
again, none of these included triggering Article 50. Finally, the European Union Referendum 
Act 2015, which authorised the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU, made no 
provision in the event of a ‘Leave’ vote.  
35 An argument said to be strengthened by the fact that Parliament had been made fully 
cognizant of Article 50, since it had added the Treaty of Lisbon to those given effect by the 
ECA by European Union Amendment Act 2008 but had made no provision requiring 
parliamentary assent for its use. Lord Reed in dissent argued that this recognition of the 
right of exit must be taken to affect the relevant intention of Parliament in relation to EU 
law rights: Miller at [198]-[204]. A similar argument was previously advanced by the author: 
note 32 above at 1084-85; on reflection, however, the mere recognition of a Treaty right to 
exit by Parliament (which did not in itself become part of UK law, since not directly effective 
- see note 36 below) cannot affect the determination of which organ of government has a 
right to trigger such exit given that Article 50 makes no provision on this point.   
36 John Finnis, “Brexit and the Balance of Our Constitution” (Policy Exchange Website, 2016), 
available https://policyexchange.org.uk/judicial-power-project-john-finnis-on-brexit-and-
the-balance-of-our-constitution/ (hereafter Finnis, ‘Balance’). The reception into domestic 
law of Article 50 via the 2008 Act led to an argument advanced by Robert Craig that Article 
50 itself has direct effect and so the 2008 Act adding the Lisbon Treaty  to the ECA already 
amounted to a statutory power to withdraw that had placed the former prerogative into 
abeyance. This argument was not advanced by the Government (doubtless because it would 
likely have led to a reference to the CJEU) but was described as ‘arguable’ by Lord Reed 
(Miller, at [201]). For a detailed critique of the argument see Phillipson, note 32 above, 
1069-78.   
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withdrawal by Executive prerogative powers would plainly have been excluded. This then 
essentially became an argument about the interpretation of legislative silence: was it for the 
Government to show express or implied parliamentary approval of a right to exit, or for the 
claimants to show that Parliament had plainly restricted it? In this regard the claimants’ 
hand was strengthened by the well-established principle that ‘fundamental rights cannot be 
overridden by general…words” in a statute.37 The argument that statutory silence could be 
construed as allowing for their effective removal was always therefore a difficult one.   
This is partly why the Government in the Supreme Court ran a new line of argument, 
namely conditionality – one taken directly from commentary written by Finnis38 and Elliott,39 
that the ECA Act assumes but does not require UK membership and is thus a mere ‘conduit’ 
through which EU law passes, but one does not require any content to flow through it and 
would thus not be frustrated by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. This argument is 
considered in detail below.  
B. The findings of the Supreme Court 
Later sections of this article subject particular aspects of the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning to detailed analysis. Here a brief summary of its key findings is given. The Court 
held by 8-3 that the UK Government could not use the foreign affairs prerogative to 
commence the process of withdrawing the UK from the EU – a process assumed to result in 
the UK’s inevitable exit two years after Article 50 was triggered40 - for the following reasons.    
The result of the UK’s exit from the EU would be to profoundly change domestic law 
and remove domestic law rights – those EU law rights given domestic effect by Parliament in 
the European Communities Act 1972, as seen above.41 Doing this would frustrate the basic 
purpose of the ECA, which was to give effect to and enable the UK’s membership of the 
                                                          
37 Ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 131. 
38 ‘Brexit: on why as a matter of law-triggering Article 50 does not require parliament to 
legislate’, available at https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/06/30/brexit-on-why-as-a-
matter-of-law-triggering-article-50-does-not-require-parliament-to-legislate 
39 Finnis, ‘Balance’, note 36 above; see also ‘Terminating Treaty-based UK Rights’ (Policy 
Exchange, 26 October 2016) available http://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/john-finnis-
terminating-treaty-based-uk-rights/  
40 Article 50(3) TFEU and Miller, at [34] and [36]-[37].  
41 Miller, at [83]. 
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EU.42  In particular, the Court found that membership of the EU and the effect given to it by 
Parliament via the ECA had given rise to a ‘new source’ of law in the UK, namely directly-
effective EU law.43 Hence, the Court held, while the content of EU law was not fixed by the 
ECA, but rather varied ‘from time to time’, Ministers could not, through withdrawal, bring 
about the cutting off of the source of law itself:44this would render the ECA wholly 
redundant.  Thus Miller affirms the principle from the Bill of Rights 1688 and the earlier Case 
of Proclamations45 that the prerogative may not be used to alter domestic law, frustrate the 
purpose of a statute, dispense with or suspend its effective operation or remove domestic 
law rights. While these principles are of long standing, they had not all been either affirmed 
or applied in modern times,46 and certainly not by the UK’s apex court.  
 Particularly controversial has been the Supreme Court’s seeming addition to the 
above principles the further proposition that the prerogative may not be used to bring 
about ‘a major change to UK constitutional arrangements’.47 The removal of EU law as a 
source of domestic law, the majority said, would amount to just such a major constitutional 
change and the majority ‘cannot accept’ that this ‘can be achieved by a minister alone; it 
must be effected in the only way that the UK constitution recognises, namely by 
Parliamentary legislation.’48.  
 Both this and the ‘source’ argument were said by the Supreme Court to be 
supported by the fact that Parliament had via the ECA given EU law a unique constitutional 
status:49 instead of being displaced by subsequent inconsistent statutes, it had the effect of 
requiring under section 2(4) the disapplication of any future inconsistent enactments – as 
                                                          
42 As the Supreme Court said, ‘ministers cannot frustrate the purpose of a statute or 
statutory provision…by emptying it of content or preventing its effectual operation’: Miller, 
at [51]. 
43Miller, at [65], [80]. 
44 Ibid at [79]-[81].   
45 (1610) 12  Co. Rep. 74. 
46 Though Article 1 of the Bill of Rights 1688 was applied in New Zealand, in Fitzgerald v 
Muldoon [1976] 2 NZLR 615.  
47 Miller at [82].   
48 Ibid, at [82]. 
49 Ibid at [81].  
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demonstrated in Factortame (no 2),50 a status required by the core EU doctrine of the 
primacy of EU law over national law. This strikingly illustrated the nature and significance of 
the constitutional change brought about through membership and the enactment of the 
ECA, adding force to the argument that the Executive could not, by use of the prerogative, 
change the constitution again by rendering the ECA a dead letter through withdrawal.  
As indicated above, it was the ‘new source of law’ and ‘constitutional change’ 
arguments that were apparently novel in the Supreme Court judgment – and which have 
proved most controversial.  While this article will consider these arguments in detail, it is 
important to note at the outset that one could dispense completely with both of them and 
still maintain a successful argument for the claimants based on frustration of the ECA and 
removal from citizens of EU law rights. The loss of these rights was stated explicitly by the 
Divisional Court51 to be sufficient ground for the claimants to win on its own. And the 
Supreme Court explicitly endorses this finding, saying:  ‘the Divisional Court was also right to 
say that this was another ground for justifying the conclusion in favour of the claimant.’52   
Thus even if all the criticism directed by Mark Elliott at the source of law and 
constitutional change arguments were right, one could regard these as akin to firing 
broadsides at a decoy: for Robert Craig, for example, the real argument for the claimants is 
the frustration argument – which he believes stands separately.53  While this is undoubtedly 
correct, this article regards the ‘constitutional change’ argument as of particular interest to 
readers of this journal in raising broader questions about the role and status of EU law in 
national domestic law.  
There is however a key Government argument that, had it been successful, would 
have answered all the claimant arguments: this is the afore-mentioned contention that all 
the rights granted under all the legislation giving effect to the UK’s membership of the EU 
were conditional upon membership, which had always remained revocable by the 
Executive. It was this argument that lay at the heart of the 3-judge dissent in Miller, 
                                                          
50 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd (No 2) [1991] 1 A.C. 603, 
applying s. 2(4) ECA.   
51 Above, note 25 above at [63].  
52 Miller at [83].  
53 Robert Craig, ‘A simple application of the frustration principle: prerogative, statute and 
Miller’ [2017] Public Law (forthcoming) [insert page numbers at proof stage].  
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articulated fully in a much-praised judgment by Lord Reed, to which Lords Carnwarth and 
Wilson added supporting dicta.  Therefore it will be considered before turning to the 
controversies surrounding ‘source of law’ and ‘constitutional change’.  
III. THE CONDITIONALITY ARGUMENT: EU LAW RIGHTS AS ‘CONTINGENT’. 
 
A. The basic argument 
As Alison Young summarises the starting point of this argument:  
The rights and obligations brought into UK law through the 1972 Act were 
conditional upon the UK’s continued membership of the EU. As such, Parliament 
enacted legislation to join the EU, but the effect of the legislation was conditional 
upon membership.54  
Membership itself was brought about not by Parliament but by the Executive, using its 
prerogative powers to ratify the Treaty of Accession, which connected – ‘plumbed in’ in 
Young’s colourful phrase55 – the UK legal system to the EU. Thus all rights and obligations 
given effect by EU law were conditional upon membership, and since it is established law 
that the prerogative can be used to withdraw from Treaties, and Parliament had placed no 
overt restrictions on that power, the domestic effect of EU law must be taken to have 
depended from the outset upon the continued decision of the UK Government to remain a 
member of the EU. And just as it was the Crown that had brought about the UK’s 
membership of the EU, the Crown could withdraw from it. This rendered all EU law rights 
granted contingent on membership. Hence the argument was made that, in Lord Reed’s 
words:  
‘If Parliament grants rights on the basis, express or implied, that they will expire in 
certain circumstances, then no further legislation is needed if those circumstances 
occur.’56  
                                                          
54 Alison Young ‘R. (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union: Thriller or Vanilla?’ (2017) EL Rev. 281 at 289.   
55 Ibid at 290.  
56 Miller at [219]. 
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There was of course no ‘express’ statement in the ECA or any other relevant Act of 
Parliament that the rights would ‘expire in certain circumstances’. Attempting to bolster the 
Government side of the argument that this was implied, Finnis drew an analogy with 
legislation giving domestic effect to extradition treaties:57 these provisions, he argued, 
seriously affected the rights of UK citizens – but the effect of the legislation can be 
terminated purely by exercise of the prerogative. However, the comparison if anything 
undermined his case: section 7 of the 1862 Act, which he quotes, states in terms that “This 
Act shall continue in force during the continuance of the said [extradition treaty].” Those 
words certainly make plain that that particular Act could lawfully have its effect ‘switched 
off’ by the UK’s withdrawal from the relevant treaty - but the example only serves to 
highlight the absence of any equivalent statement in the ECA or other EU-related 
legislation.58 As a result, argument focused on the question of whether the ECA carried the 
‘implication’ that it was granting only ‘contingent’ rights that the Executive could at any time 
render ‘spent’ through withdrawal.  
The Government was always in some difficulty making this argument from the 
moment it was conceded that the triggering of Article 50 would inevitably result in the 
disappearance of at least some EU law rights currently enjoyed by UK citizens. Since it was 
well established that the prerogative could not be used so as to bring about the loss of 
rights enjoyed in domestic law the Government was forced to argue that the rights were, 
despite appearances, not really domestic law rights at all. Thus an important argument 
made was that, as Mark Elliott puts it:   
EU law is not domestic law in any normal or ultimate sense. Rather it forms a distinct 
body of law that has effect in domestic law, in the sense of being enforceable in 
national legal proceedings. As Lord Reed put it: “The 1972 Act did not create 
                                                          
57 Finnis, ‘Balance’, note 36 above at 15-16.  
58 The 1862 Act was replaced by an Act of 1870 which provides for the domestic effect of 
extradition treaties made with other states to be given domestic effect by Orders in Council. 
However section 2 of the Act (also quoted by Finnis) states clearly that ‘Every such Order… 
shall not remain in force for any longer period than the arrangement’ with the foreign state, 
thus, like the 1862 Act, explicitly authorising the Executive to render the domestic legal 
instrument ‘spent’ through withdrawal from the relevant treaty.  
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statutory rights in the same sense as other statutes, but gave legal effect in the UK to 
a body of law now known as EU law.”59 
  
The argument is that when those rights disappear from domestic law upon withdrawal this 
does not constitute loss of domestic rights because these were not rights created by 
Parliament, but rather rights flowing from the international plane to which Parliament had 
merely given domestic effect. As Elliott summarises the argument: ‘The axiom that the 
prerogative cannot be used to change domestic law does not bite directly upon EU law if it is 
not, in the first place, domestic law.’60  One might observe that in placing so very much 
weight on this rather fine distinction between domestic law rights and rights that are merely 
‘given effect’ in domestic law, Lord Reed and his academic supporters are teetering next to 
an abyss of bottomless formalism. From the point of view of ordinary people going about 
their daily lives, relying on and enforcing their EU employment law rights, their rights to 
equal pay, their environmental law rights, this distinction would appear quite meaningless. 
These were, after all, rights that, just like purely UK-law based rights, were binding on the 
UK Government and enforceable in domestic courts. To be told that the disappearance of 
these rights brought about by Brexit doesn’t ‘count’ as a ‘loss of domestic law rights’ 
because they not ‘created’ by a UK statute but merely ‘given effect by it’ is an argument that 
would sound quite unreal from the perspective of the rights-holder. This was especially so 
given that these rights actually had a unique status in UK law in that they were guaranteed – 
unlike any other rights – even against subsequent inconsistent legislation by Parliament.61 
Whereas ordinary statutory rights can be overridden by a later statute, and common law 
rights abolished or modified by legislation, these were the closest things UK citizens had to 
what in other countries are termed ‘constitutional rights’ – rights that bind even the 
legislature.62  
                                                          
59 Elliott, note 12 above at 271, citing Lord Reed at [216].  
60 Elliot, ibid. 
61 Per section 2(4) ECA; this status was of course required by the core EU law doctrine of the 
primacy of EU law over national law.  
62 A recent dramatic example is the decision in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department ex p David Davis MP and ors, [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin), in which the High 
Court disapplied a provision of the 2014 Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act and 
regulations made under it in reliance on the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, as 
interpreted by the CJEU. On appeal the Court of Appeal referred the issue to the CJEU: 
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This awkward fact introduced into a Government argument already suffering from 
an unappealing degree of formalism a striking constitutional incongruity. The essence of its 
position was that statutes granting EU rights were a novel category – what the 
Government’s appeal case dubs ‘subsidiary statutes.’63 It was hard not to see such statutes - 
those that merely give effect to EU law rights in domestic law – as having a lower status than 
ordinary statutes: lower, precisely because they were said to be statutes that, unlike others, 
may lawfully be rendered ‘spent’ or ‘otiose’ by Executive fiat. In other words, their 
provisions, unlike those of other statutes, are not in practice superior in the constitutional 
hierarchy to the prerogative, but rather have effect only precariously, subject to its exercise. 
This allowed the Government to argue that the rights given effect by such statutes should 
not be seen as statutory rights at all, but something lesser – mere contingent entitlements, 
removable via the prerogative.64  
The difficulty for a court minded to accept this argument is that it is then necessary 
to attempt to reconcile this inferior status with the fact that, as already mentioned, 
Parliament had given the ECA an elevated status above those of ordinary Acts of Parliament: 
elevated in that it could - and did - override and displace even the provisions of future Acts 
of Parliament as the famous Factortame litigation demonstrated.  This result of Factortame 
(No 2)65 – the disapplication of the later Merchant Shipping Act 1988 by the earlier ECA – 
was such a remarkable result that it led Sir William Wade to describe the result of the case 
as a technical ‘revolution’.66  While this may have been an exaggeration, the rulings of the 
then House of Lords in Factortame (No 1)67, and Factortame (No 2)  together showed 
beyond doubt that the ECA, and the EU law it gives effect to, have an elevated constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
[2015] EWCA Civ 1185. See also Benkharbouche & Janah v Embassy of the Republic of Sudan 
& Others [2015] EWCA Civ 33 in which the Court of Appeal relied on EU law rights to set 
aside long-standing principles of state immunity in respect of matters taking place in 
Embassies (in this case the issue was their compatibility with employment law) set out in the 
State Immunity Act 1961. In contrast, under the Human Rights Act 1998 (which gives 
domestic effect to the rights in the European Convention on Human Rights) the courts could 
issue only a non-binding ‘declaration of incompatibility’ against the 1961 Act.  
63 R (on the application of Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union UKSC 
2016/196: Printed Case of the Appellant, at [000].  
64 Ibid at [49]: ‘…the proposition that the ECA “creates domestic law rights”….is not correct’.   
65 note 50 above.  
66 Sir William Wade, “Sovereignty – Revolution or Evolution” (1996) 112 LQR 568. 
67  [1990] 2 AC 85.  
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status in UK law – and one that was bestowed by Parliament itself.68  Thus not only were the 
Government and its academic supporters arguing for (in effect) a second-class category of 
statutes but were doing so in the face of Parliament’s clear intention to endow the most 
important of these statutes with an elevated status that was unprecedented. As discussed 
below, this was in the end a factor that led both the Divisional Court and the Supreme Court 
to find against this Government argument.  
The above indicates the extent to which the Government’s lawyers and their 
academic supporters were faced with something of a herculean task. Even leaving aside the 
constitutional incongruity just mentioned, the basic fact remained that termination of the 
UK’s membership of the EU via the prerogative would remove all the EU rights that flowed 
through the conduit of the ECA into domestic law.69 On the face of it, the abrupt 
disappearance of these rights would amount to a radical change to domestic law, contrary 
to well-established principle. Moreover the very fact that it was statute that gave effect to 
those rights appeared to raise a prima facie presumption that only statute – not prerogative 
- could authorise their removal.  
Thus the only way of avoiding this conclusion was for those arguing the 
Government’s side of the case to propose a remarkable constitutional novelty:70 a statute 
that gave effect to rights in domestic law – but which was always intended by Parliament to 
be contingent on executive action on the international plane that could have the effect of 
terminating the rights. One might suggest that for such an intention to made out some fairly 
clear wording would be required. What specific arguments, then were used to support this 
reading?  
                                                          
68 Objections to the notion that this status can be bestowed by Parliament, rather than by 
the common law, are considered below at 000-000.   
69 The possibility of the rights being transferred into domestic law (via the proposed Great 
Repeal Bill) was disregarded given that it was agreed the court had to consider the position 
as it was then.  
70 Finnis’s attempt to suggest that there was a clear existing analogy with Double Taxation 
Treaties was subject to comprehensive critique showing the contrary: see esp. K. Beal ,’The 
Taxing Issues Arising in Miller’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (14 Nov 2016); J. King and N. Barber, ‘In 
Defence of Miller‘, U.K. Const. L. Blog (22nd Nov 2016); E. Smith, ‘Treaty Rights in Miller and 
Dos Santos v. Secretary of State for Leaving the European Union‘, U.K. Const. L. Blog (16th 
Nov 2016). The example of extradition treaties is also distinguished above at text to notes 
59 and 60.  
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A. The textual argument: ‘from time to time’  
This argument was first advanced by Mark Elliott71 and appeared prominently in the 
Government’s case on appeal.72 It fastens on the use of the words ‘from time to time’ in 
section 2(1) ECA, arguing that as a result, the ECA gave effect to no particular content of EU 
law but only whatever directly applicable EU law there is, as it varies ‘from time to time’. As 
Elliott puts it, the result is that ‘effecting Brexit will not (as had been suggested) render the 
ECA “a dead letter”, because [that statute] serves simply to give effect to whatever EU 
obligations, if any, the UK has at any given point in time.’73 
However this contention was vulnerable to the counter-argument, made by the 
majority, that there was a ‘vital difference between changes in domestic law resulting from 
variations in the content of EU law arising from new EU legislation’ and the complete 
removal of the source of EU law that withdrawal would entail.74 Moreover, as the majority 
pointed out, the phrase ‘from time to time’ applied only to the rights and obligations arising 
‘by or under the Treaties’ and not to the Treaties themselves. These are listed in section 1 of 
the ECA and can only be added to the ECA through amending it by primary legislation,75 a 
feature of the ECA which tended to suggest that Parliament intended itself to control the 
domestic law impact of major changes to the Treaties, as opposed to the secondary 
legislation flowing from the EU institutions. Finnis attempted to offer a reading of the ECA 
that would have collapsed this basic distinction, contending that section 2(1) ‘gives domestic 
legal effect only to the Treaties as they are in force “from time to time”, that is, only as long 
                                                          
71 Elliott, note 38 above. It was noted as a possible argument but dismissed as a mis-reading 
of the ECA in the original blogpost by Barber et al: note 22 above.  
72 See note 63 above at [8].  
73 Elliott, note 12 above at 262. The words ‘if any’ do not of course appear in the ECA.  
74 Miller at [78].  
75 This is with the exception of what the ECA terms ‘ancillary treaties’, which, per s 1 (2) and 
(3) ECA can be added to the Act without primary legislation, using the Order in Council 
procedure and requiring approval only by way of a Resolution in each House. The term 
‘ancillary treaties’ is not defined in the ECA but it has never been used to apply to the major 
treaties changing and enlarging the EU. Mikolaj Barczentewicz argues that the scope of 
‘ancillary treaties’ was regarded at the time as being much broader than this, but this is 
scarcely definitive, while his assertion that an ancillary treaty could have brought about the 
cessation of the application of EU law to the UK (in a way similar to the effect of Brexit) is 
made without any supporting authority at all and as such seems an unpersuasive 
hypothetical: ‘Miller, Statutory Interpretation, and the True Place of EU Law in UK Law’ 
(forthcoming) [2017] Public Law 000 at 000-000 [insert page nos at proof stage].  
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as they are in force.’ But section 2(1) does not apply the phrase ‘from time to time’ to the 
Treaties themselves. It refers only to ‘rights, powers, obligations’ and the like ‘from time to 
time created or arising by or under the Treaties’ (emphasis added). No text in the Act states 
that legal effect is only to be given to the Treaties ‘as long as they are in force’.76  
Nevertheless, there is an argument to be made based purely on the generic wording 
of section 2(1) – and indeed Lord Reed subjects that provision to very close analysis indeed, 
arguing that it provides that where there is law that satisfies the condition of being directly 
effective, the ECA gives effect to it, but does not require that there be any such law.77 It is 
also true that there is no explicit statement in the ECA requiring that the UK be a member of 
the EU – although taken in historical context, this omission is unsurprising, as discussed 
below (000-000).  
The Government then took this argument a step further in pointing out that British 
Ministers make regular use of the prerogative when they negotiate and vote in the Council 
of Ministers on EU secondary legislation – legislation that then flows into UK law through 
the ‘conduit’ of section 2(1) ECA.  It was then argued that this in itself showed that the 
prerogative was regularly having the effect of altering domestic law,78 and that withdrawal 
would amount only to a change that was greater than this in scale.79 But the obvious 
rejoinder to this argument was that this feed-through of agreement made on the 
international EU plane into changes to domestic law is specifically allowed for by Parliament 
through the terms of section 2(1). Indeed, in this way, the phrase ‘from time to time’ in 
section 2(1), so often prayed in aid by supporters of the Government case, may actually be 
turned back on its proponents. It can be argued that the ECA included this provision 
precisely in order to allow prerogative actions on the international plane to vary domestic 
law, as the content of EU law changed. In the absence of this permission, the standard 
                                                          
76 Cf. the Human Rights Act 1998, which gives domestic effect to the rights under the 
European Convention on Human Rights; in that Act the Convention is defined (in s 21(1)) as 
the treaty ‘as it has effect, for the time being, in relation to the United Kingdom’. For 
discussion, see A. Young and G. Phillipson, ‘Would use of the prerogative to denounce the 
ECHR ‘frustrate’ the Human Rights Act? Lessons from Miller’ (forthcoming) [2017 Public Law 
000 [insert page numbers at proof stage].    
77 Miller at [184] – [191].  
78 Note 63 above, at [8].  
79 Ibid at [60].  
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constitutional rule that the Executive cannot change domestic law or remove domestic law 
rights applies. In other words, section 2(1) is explicit parliamentary authorisation to allow 
for what would ordinarily be prohibited.80 Thus rather than section 2(1) carrying the 
implication that Parliament had granted the Executive carte blanche to do anything to EU 
law, including completely terminating its application to the UK by withdrawing from the 
treaties, it shows the opposite: Parliament had allowed for the variation only of rights 
arising ‘by or under the Treaties’ – it had not allowed for removal of the Treaties 
themselves.  
B. The non-textual argument: the general assertion of conditionality 
 A further notable feature of the conditionality argument is that, as seen above, huge 
weight was placed on the particular wording of section 2(1)81 and the fact that it permitted 
a varying content of EU law. This was argued to give section 2(1) a particular ‘ambulatory’ 
quality, such that it acts merely as a conduit for whatever EU law has direct effect from time 
to time. But what is striking about those taking the Government’s side of the case is that, 
when confronted with a statute implementing EU law that has none of these qualities, such 
as the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002, they simply read in contingency anyway. 
This suggests that the conclusion for such commentators comes first: EU law rights must be 
read as not really domestic law rights because always contingent on an Executive decision to 
withdraw from the EU. If there is language in a statute that supports this reading – such as 
‘from time to time’ in section 2(1) – all well and good. But if there is none, the implication is 
insisted upon anyway.  
The European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002 was cited by the claimant side for 
two reasons. First, as noted above, it was accepted that there was a category (3) of EU law 
rights enjoyed by UK citizens that would inevitably be lost on exit.82 Amongst these were the 
constitutionally significant rights to stand and vote in elections to the European Parliament, 
given effect in the UK by the 2002 Act. In the High Court the Category 3 rights emerged as a 
                                                          
80 As Paul Craig puts it:  ‘Parliament…modified its normal dualist position, which required 
separate transformation or adoption of each international legal norm, by signifying in 
advance through section 2(1) its willingness to accommodate directly applicable and directly 
effective EU norms within the UK legal order’: note 3 above at 000.  
81 See for example the elaborate analysis of it by Lord Reed at [184]-[191].  
82 See above, text to and note 29.  
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‘killer argument’ for the claimants, precisely because the Government side seemed to have 
no counter to the claim of their inevitable loss. However, the treatment by the majority in 
the Supreme Court of this category of rights was somewhat equivocal.83 The second 
difference is that, whereas the ECA has a particular ‘ambulatory’ quality, giving rise only to a 
generic, variable set of rights, the 2002 Act looks much more like a standard Act of 
Parliament: it spells out specific, discrete rights in relation to elections to the European 
Parliament.  Section 1, in stating, ‘there shall be 72 members of the European Parliament 
(MEPs) elected for the United Kingdom’, appears to manifest clear Parliamentary intention 
that there shall be elections for MEPs in the UK. Similarly, section 8(1) states: 
A person is entitled to vote as an elector at an election to the European Parliament 
in an electoral region if he is within any of subsections (2) to (5) [which set out the 
categories of those entitled to vote].84 
On its face therefore the Act requires the election of MEPs ‘for the UK’ and gives a right to 
vote to those UK citizens entitled to vote in elections as well as to resident EU citizens. It 
                                                          
83 At one point the majority appears to misunderstand the significance of rights being in the 
third category, asserting: ‘If [the claimants] cannot succeed in their argument based on loss 
of rights in the first category, then invoking loss of rights in the other categories would not 
help them; and if they can succeed on the basis of loss of rights in the first category, they 
would not need to invoke loss of rights in the other categories’ (Miller at [73]). While the 
second assertion here is clearly correct the first, with respect, seems erroneous. One key 
difference between the two categories is that the first category rights flowed mainly 
through section 2(1) of the European Communities Act83 which, as seen above, can be 
argued to have a specific ‘ambulatory’ character in only giving effect to such EU law rights, 
obligations etc as apply ‘from time to time’. Thus as a matter of pure statutory construction, 
one could conclude that the loss of category one rights flowing through the ECA did not 
amount to frustration of that particular statute: as noted above, the core of Lord Reed’s 
dissent is built around his construction of section 2(1) as ambulatory in this sense. But, as 
discussed in the text, the whole point about the rights arising under the 2002 Act is that 
they are spelled out in the text of the Act itself. At least in principle, therefore, it would be 
perfectly conceivable for a court to hold that the ECA would not be frustrated by 
withdrawal, but that the 2002 Act, with its very different way of giving effect to specific 
category 3 rights, would be. 
84This provision was highlighted in J. King and N. Barber, ‘In Defence of Miller‘, U.K. Const. L. 
Blog (22nd Nov 2016).  
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thus appeared to provide an answer to the argument that, because EU law rights are not 
statutory rights because ‘Parliament never enacted the rights in question’.85 
The Supreme Court made no definitive finding on the 2002 Act, remarking only: ‘we 
consider that the arguments based on the 2002 Act do nothing to undermine and may be 
regarded as reinforcing [our] conclusion.86 However it is worthy of some attention87 
precisely because it is an example of conditionality being insisted upon in the absence of any 
engagement with the text of the Act – something that forms a strong contrast with the 
intense focus on the precise wording and structure of section 2(1) ECA.88 Thus Finnis’s main 
argument on the 2002 Act begins by asserting: 
the 2002 Act discloses no intention that there be elections in the UK to the European 
Parliament, but rather the intention that if and when under EU law there arises an 
obligation or opportunity for Member states to conduct elections to that Parliament, 
then such elections shall be conducted in the UK in the manner specified in the 2002 
Act.89 
Finnis cites no specific textual evidence in support of this contention from the Act, its long 
title or elsewhere to establish such intention. Neither does he cite any Pepper v 
Hart statement from the relevant minister. Similarly Mark Elliott,90 whose arguments were 
adopted wholesale by the Government on appeal,91  argued that, while the rights in the 
2002 Act look different from those under the ECA, they are nevertheless still very much EU 
law-dependent. Again, the argument is not based on any specific textual evidence. Instead, 
                                                          
85 R. Ekins ‘Constitutional practice and principle in the article 50 litigation’ (2007) 133(Jul) 
LQR 347, 348.  
86 Miller at [115]. 
87 For an earlier version of this argument, see G. Phillipson “The Miller Case, Part 1: A 
Response to Some Criticisms”, U.K. Const. L. Blog (25 November 2016). 
88 Similarly Barczentewicz, in seeking to show that Miller was wrongly decided, proffers a 
close analysis of section 1 of the 1972 Act: note 75 above.  
89 J. Finnis, ‘Terminating Treaty-based UK Rights: A Supplementary Note’, U.K. Const. L. Blog 
(2nd Nov 2016). Elsewhere he went further, suggesting that the Act only provides for 
‘elections at such times if any as such an election of UK members is possible under EU law’ - 
the words ‘if any’ being of course his own: note 36 above at 24. 
90 Article 50, the royal prerogative, and the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002’, 21 
November 2016,  available at https://publiclawforeveryone.com/2016/11/21/article-50-the-
royal-prerogative-and-the-european-parliamentary-elections-act-2002/ 
91 Note 63 above at [63d], which appears to quote Elliott directly.  
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in claiming that the 2002 Act ‘does not require the UK to hold elections to the EP or 
otherwise guarantee that any such elections will take place’, Elliott instead relies on the 
argument that the UK Parliament  
 
‘is not — and cannot be — in any position to create such an entitlement. The most 
[it] can do is to make arrangements for the exercise of such EU electoral rights as are 
provided for by EU law.92 
 
First, then, it may be noted that the argument has changed from being one based on 
specific provisions of an Act of Parliament (such as section 2(1) ECA) to a general assertion 
that these rights are derived from EU law and for that reason cannot function as domestic 
law rights.  This indicates that the section 2(1) argument cannot be treated as decisive, since 
conditionality is insisted upon even where nothing like it is present in the relevant statute. 
Second, there are aspects of the argument made in which a key distinction is conflated. 
Both Elliott and the Government’s appeal case argue that Parliament cannot sensibly have 
intended to grant rights to stand and vote in elections to the European Parliament in 
perpetuity (or ‘come what may’, as Elliott puts it). Thus the Government pointed out that:  
 ‘If the Member States had…agreed a treaty which abolished the European 
Parliament, s 8 of the [2002] Act, conferring the right to vote in elections to the EP, 
would be otiose for lack of underpinning international law.’93  
This, they say, demonstrates that the rights are conditional. As Elliott puts it, they are 
dependent upon the treaty obligations that call for the making of arrangements for the 
exercise of EU electoral right. If those disappear, ‘then the Act the purpose of the Act is not 
thereby frustrated. Rather, the Act is, in effect, spent…’.94 
However, there are two very different propositions being conflated here. It may well 
be that particular statutes can be rendered otiose because of the actions of other states. 
(Indeed one might add that other external events, like natural disasters, could have this 
effect: if a freak tidal wave wiped out Northern Ireland, it could be said to have removed a 
                                                          
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid at 25, fn 12. 
94 Elliott, note 90 above (emphasis added).  
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vital condition precedent (the existence of Northern Ireland) for the operation of 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998). But this misses a vital distinction. The frustration argument 
consists solely of the assertion that the British Government may not, through use of its 
prerogative, frustrate a statute by rendering it otiose. The fact that the actions of foreign 
states could have the same or similar effects on a UK statute is nothing to the point:  the 
frustration principle has never applied to the actions of other states or foreign governments. 
Thus establishing that rights to vote in the EU Parliament are ‘contingent’ upon the actions 
of other states not abolishing that Parliament (or bringing the EU itself to an end) 
establishes nothing relevant.  
In contrast, it is sensible to say that Parliament doubtless only intended these rights 
to be exercisable for as long as UK remained a member of the EU.95 But that in itself tells us 
nothing in support of the proposition that that membership can be terminated solely via use 
of the prerogative. Let us recall that it is a general principle of UK constitutional law that use 
of the prerogative may not remove or frustrate the operation of rights ‘enjoyed in domestic 
law.’96 This is a general principle of law and so does not have to be manifested expressly in 
any statute to apply. Where an exercise of the prerogative would have the effect of 
removing or frustrating such rights, it is for those seeking to justify that outcome to point to 
clear evidence in the relevant statute that parliament intended, exceptionally, to allow the 
Executive to do that which would ordinarily be unlawful. The only way of doing that is to 
point to provisions of the Act that are said to manifest such intention. Section 7 of the 1862 
Extradition Act is, as noted above, a clear example in providing, ‘This Act shall continue in 
force during the continuance of the said [treaty].’ This is clear warrant for the applicability of 
the Act being terminable by use of the prerogative to withdraw from the treaty. But 
whereas commentators do seek to find such evidence in specific provisions of the ECA,97 as 
we have seen they adduce no textual evidence from the 2002 Act that Parliament intended 
to allow the rights to which that Act gives effect to be removable via the prerogative.  
To conclude, while it is sensible to suggest that the UK Parliament intended there to 
be elections to the European Parliament only as long as that institution existed – and as long 
as the UK was a member of the EU - nothing in that intention displaces the ordinary 
                                                          
95 Which is what Lord Reed asserted briefly in his dissent: at [221].  
96 Rayner, note 19 above, at 500.  
97 Principally s 2(1); see also note 88 above re other provisions of that Act.  
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principle of law that rights once given effect in domestic law may not be removed by 
prerogative action. The 2002 Act, in which the UK Parliament provided ‘there shall be 
elections for MEPs for the UK’ and provided for the categories of those entitled to vote in 
such elections, plainly gives rise to specific rights enjoyed in domestic law. As such it 
reinforces the argument that executive action by the UK Government that would render 
such elections impossible (withdrawal) must be authorised by the Parliament that gave 
effect to the rights to participate in these elections in the first place. The argument is thus 
not that the 2002 Act intended to give rise to electoral rights ‘in perpetuity’ but simply that 
Parliament, having given effect to such rights in domestic law in statute, must be the one to 
authorise their removal.  
C. Lord Reed and lessons from history  
As noted above, the core of Lord Reed’s much-praised dissent lies in his reading of 
section 2(1) ECA as providing only that where there is directly effective EU law, it is given 
effect in UK law, but that the Act does not require that there be any. From this he concludes 
that the ECA is consistent with UK membership but does not require it. Lord Reed bolsters 
this argument by making ingenious use of one feature of the historical process by which the 
UK became a member of the EU. In order to consider his argument the full sequence of 
events needs to be briefly considered.98 The process started when British Governments in 
1961 and 1967 ‘sought the approval of the House of Commons to proceed with 
negotiations’ with the six existing members of the then EEC. Subsequently in October 1971, 
‘Heath’s Government sought the approval of the House of Commons for the UK joining…on 
the proposed terms’ – terms ‘summarised in a White Paper which had been the subject of a 
lengthy debate in late July 1971.’ And, crucially, the Prime Minister always made clear that it 
was for ‘Parliament…to take the decision of principle’99 on entry; hence if Parliament had 
not passed the Motion approving the UK’s membership in October 1971, the Government 
would not have proceeded further.100   
                                                          
98 I am indebted to Simon Renton’s detailed analysis, from which the following quotations 
are taken unless otherwise attributed: ‘Historical Perspectives and the Miller Case’, U.K. 
Const. L. Blog (19th Jan 2017). 
99 HC Deb, 17 June 1971 vol. 819, col. 645. 
100 HC Deb 28 October 1971 vol. 823, col. 2211.  
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Thus it was only once that Motion was approved that the Government proceeded to 
sign the Accession Treaty on 22 January 1972.  It then introduced into Parliament the 
European Communities Bill 1972, which provided the necessary domestic-law underpinning 
for Britain’s membership. In light of the parliamentary votes to approve joining the EU and 
the fact that the Government had by then signed the Treaty, that Act may be seen as having 
the specific purpose of enabling the UK to do what it had already agreed to do by signing 
the Treaty – join the EU on a lawful basis. It was enacted on 17 October 1972 and the UK 
instrument of ratification was deposited the very next day - on 18 October. The fact that the 
Government did not formally ratify the Treaty until after the Act was passed is explicable by 
the fact that the Government could not be sure that Parliament would pass the Act, given 
the intense controversy around the issue.101 This is vividly illustrated by the fact that, due to 
major rebellions from Conservative MPs and major opposition to membership from parts of 
the Parliamentary Labour Party,102 the Bill passed Second Reading in the Commons by only 
eight votes. In other words, the Government had to wait until the Act was passed: had it 
ratified before that point it would have risked joining the EU without the necessary 
legislative underpinning in place. This would have entailed a spectacular international fiasco: 
as the Divisional Court noted, the UK would have been in immediate and serious breach of 
EU law from day one.103 As it was, the Act was passed, and the UK joined the EU on 1 
January 1973, the date the Treaty of Accession came into force.  
The point Lord Reed takes from all of this is that, when the ECA was first passed and 
came into force, because the UK was not yet a member of the EU, the Act, at that time, had 
no practical application. There were then, as Lord Reed puts it, ‘no rights, powers and so 
forth, which, in accordance with the Treaties, were to be given legal effect in the UK’.104  
Hence ‘The content of the category of law to which the ECA gave effect [directly effective 
EU law] was therefore zero.’105 All that withdrawal means is that ‘The content would return 
                                                          
101 As Renton points out. Heath made clear that, were the Bill to be defeated, his 
Government would resign: HC Deb 17 February 1972, vol. 831 col. 753.  
102 The later 1973 Referendum confirming Britain’s decision to join was held by the Labour 
Wilson Government precisely because of the deep splits within the Labour party on the 
issue.  
103 Note 25 above at [42].  
104 Miller at [192]  
105 Ibid at [197]. 
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to zero’. In other words, withdrawal would simply return the ECA to its original state and 
cannot therefore be argued to frustrate its purpose or render it a dead letter. This is a 
variation of a submission made by Eadie QC for the Government. In response to a question 
from Lord Mance as to whether his argument was that ‘the European Communities Act 1972 
was neutral as to whether the United Kingdom was a member of the European 
Communities’, Eadie said: ‘It proceeded on the fundamental assumption that the ultimate 
decision on the international plane was a matter for Government.’106 He also observed that 
‘Parliament was merely facilitating membership’ through the Act, should the Government, 
in the exercise of its treaty prerogative powers, take the United Kingdom into [then] EEC.’107  
This is a clever argument - but quite unreal. The picture it paints is of a Parliament 
which passes the fiercely contentious European Communities Act just in case the 
Government should decide that Britain was going to join the EU. As the historical record 
above shows, in fact Parliament had been actively engaged in the decision to join, and had 
voted more than once to do so after lengthy and impassioned debates.108 Government and 
Parliament then worked in close coordination together to ensure that the UK joined the EU 
with the legal mechanisms in place that membership required.  Lord Reed seizes upon the 
happenstance that the Act was passed about 10 weeks before the UK joined; it thus sat 
there, like an empty conduit, ready for the taps to be turned on when the Treaty of 
Accession came into force on the 1st January 1973 and EU law started pouring through it 
into the UK legal system.  But the notion that this accident of history – that ten week hiatus 
- helps demonstrates the notion that Parliament was indifferent as to whether the Act it 
passed ever gave effect to any EU law at all is a brilliant fantasy.  The fact that the Act, when 
first passed, did not give effect to any EU law came about simply because the Government 
had to wait until the Act was passed to ratify the Treaty of Accession and the Treaty came 
into force some weeks later. To conclude from this that the ECA is best read as manifesting 
complete indifference to the UK’s membership of the EU is wholly unreal.  
                                                          
106 Transcript of hearing before the Supreme Court, Monday 5 December, p 49 (emphasis 
added); available https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/draft-transcript-monday-161205.pdf  
107 Ibid at 99 (emphasis added).  
108 Renton, note 98 above.  
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As observed near the beginning of this article, the ECA contains neither any 
statement that ‘the UK shall be a member of the EU’ nor any words to the effect that ‘this 
Act shall have effect only during the UK’s membership of the EU’, which would signal 
Parliament’s clear acquiescence to future withdrawal by the Executive. Therefore the issue 
comes down to how one interprets that legislative silence. And it is here that one must 
examine the fundamental ‘assumptions’ against which Parliament legislated. Eadie QC seeks 
to characterise those as being that whether the UK joined was a decision for the 
Government, so that the Act was there only to facilitate membership, should the 
Government decide to join. But, as we have seen, this cannot be reconciled with the 
historical record. The UK had already decided to join via a vote in Parliament that the Prime 
Minister admitted decided the matter of principle; the Treaty of Accession already had been 
signed and Parliament then passed an Act that, in the words of the majority, endorsed and 
gave effect to’ the UK’s membership.109 Thus if one is considering the assumptions on which 
it is realistic to suppose that Parliament legislated, the historical record makes it clear that 
the majority is right. The ECA was passed with the sole and specific purpose of giving effect 
to the UK’s imminent membership of the EU: it is not therefore ‘neutral’ as to membership.  
IV. EU law as an ‘independent source of law’ 
 
The majority in the Supreme Court set out the various ways in which EU law has 
effect in the UK110 via the European Communities Act 1972 and then remark: 
In our view, then, although the 1972 Act gives effect to EU law, it is not itself the 
originating source of that law. It is…the “conduit pipe” by which EU law is introduced 
into UK domestic law. So long as the 1972 Act remains in force, its effect is to 
constitute EU law an independent and overriding source of domestic law.111  
And later in their judgment the majority emphasises: 
                                                          
109 Miller at [77].  
110 Including, through the direct effect of certain Treaty Provisions via section 2(1) ECA; 
second through directly effective secondary EU law, principally Regulations, which also take 
effect through section 2(1); and third through the implementation via section 2(2) of 
Directives (which of course may also have direct effect in certain circumstances). 
111 Miller at [65].  
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the 1972 Act effectively constitutes EU law as an entirely new, independent and 
overriding source of domestic law, and the [CJEU] as a source of binding judicial 
decisions about its meaning. Upon the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the 
European Union, EU law will cease to be a source of domestic law…’112 
Mark Elliott is heavily critical of this analysis, arguing that when the Supreme Court 
identified EU law as ‘a direct and independent source of domestic law’:  
If that proposition is to mean anything, it must surely mean that EU law is a source of 
law whose status as such is independent of its acknowledgment by other sources of 
law, such as UK legislation.113 
And he then shows that this is not so, because its status in UK law is determined by another 
recognised source of law, namely statute, in the form of the European Communities Act. 
Hence EU law is not an independent source of law at all. As he puts it, ‘The majority appears 
to end up contending that EU law is both dependent for its domestic status upon the ECA 
and an independent source of domestic law’; hence their judgment is in this respect mired in 
contradiction.114  
A. The Rule of Recognition  
There is certainly an appearance of inconsistency here; undoubtedly the majority 
agrees that the domestic effect of EU law depends on a domestic statute (the ECA); hence 
EU law cannot be said to be a ‘independent’ source in the sense of having effect 
independent of any existing statute (as does common law, for example). Moreover, 
understanding the majority decision here is not helped by the fact that, while declaring EU 
law an independent source of law, they also say clearly that the reception of EU law in the 
UK has not changed the Rule of Recognition in the UK.115 However it appears likely that 
what the Supreme Court intended to say here is that the supreme rule in the UK 
constitution – parliamentary sovereignty - had not changed, since Parliament remains 
                                                          
112 Ibid at [80]  
113 Note 12 above, at 272.  
114 ibid. The reference to the lack of a change in the rule of recognition in the reasoning of 
the majority can be found in Miller at [60]. 
115 A concept famously developed by HLA Hart in his classic work of legal positivism, The 
Concept of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2nd edn, 1994).  
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legally competent both to alter the status of EU law in domestic law and indeed to remove 
its effect completely, through repeal of the ECA. Thus the majority observes that 
‘consistently with the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty … the 1972 Act can be repealed 
like any other statute’ and continues: 
For that reason, we would not accept that the so-called fundamental rule of 
recognition (i.e. the fundamental rule by reference to which all other rules are 
validated) underlying UK laws has been varied by the 1972 Act or would be varied by 
its repeal.116  
The phrase ‘Rule of Recognition’ is sometimes used, rather loosely, to refer to what is in fact 
the ‘supreme rule’ of any system, which in the UK’s case is parliament’s ability to enact or 
repeal any law, and it seems tolerably clear that this is what the majority meant at this 
point. In fact, the notion of the ‘Rule of Recognition’, as proposed by Hart, actually refers to 
that set of rules which identify the sources of law within the UK constitution, the rules 
governing them and the hierarchical relationship between them. As the distinguished legal 
philosopher, Sir Neil McCormack has pointed out, parliamentary sovereignty is not as such 
‘the rule of recognition’ in the UK but rather ‘the supreme criterion of validity’ within its rule 
of recognition.117 
Once this is understood it becomes clear that the inception of EU law in the UK 
constitution did change the rule of recognition, in three ways.118 First it altered it by adding 
EU law as a new source of law to the UK constitution. Any notion that it is only sources of 
law wholly independent of other sources that ‘count’ in the Rule of Recognition is refuted by 
noting that MacCormick himself listed the relevant sources of the UK constitution (prior to 
                                                          
116 Miller at [60].  
117 Sir Neil MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty, (Oxford: OUP, 1999), at 83. I am grateful 
to Tom Poole whose essay highlights this important point from MacCormick: Poole, note 13 
above at 703.  
118 I therefore respectfully disagree with the view of Alison Young on this point: note 54 
above at 291-92. Some of Young’s analysis appears to me to conflate the ‘supreme rule’ 
within the Rule of Recognition (Parliament’s unchanged ability to amend or repeal any law) 
with the Rule of Recognition itself; however at p. 293 Young suggests that the Rule of 
Recognition may have changed but not the ‘fundamental’ (which I take to mean the 
‘supreme’) rule of parliamentary sovereignty itself, which concurs with my own analysis and 
that of Robert Craig (note 53 above at 000).   
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1972) as follows: ‘in rank order, Acts of Parliament, acts of [intra vires] delegated 
legislation… and precedents of the higher courts, themselves ranked hierarchically”.119 The 
fact that delegated legislation is listed as a separate source, despite the fact that it is not 
‘independent’ (it derives from Acts of Parliament) disposes of the argument that EU law 
cannot be classified as a separate source as a matter of analytical jurisprudence. Indeed, as 
Robert Craig observes, Acts of the Scottish Parliament, as a source of primary legal norms, 
must also be added to the Rule of Recognition (thus changing it) even though they too 
derive their authority, ultimately, from Acts of the UK Parliament.120 The second way in 
which the Rule of Recognition changed was in the priority afforded to directly effective EU 
law over subsequent statutes, as set out in section 2(4) and accepted by the House of Lords 
in the Factortame litigation.121 While the understanding now is that section 2(4) could be 
overridden by express words in a later Act of Parliament, it still, at the very least, modified 
the doctrine of implied repeal, which is part of the Rule of Recognition. Finally a further 
change was made by the placing at the top of the hierarchy of judicial precedents rulings of 
the CJEU on questions of EU law.122  
B. Source as origin  
The above analysis has shown that it is correct, as a matter of analytical jurisprudence, to 
identify EU law as a new source of law, and as having modified the Rule of Recognition (but 
not the ‘supreme rule’). But are the majority still open to criticism for conceptualising EU 
law as both an independent source and as dependent for its status on the ECA? Certainly the 
judgment appears to set up some tension here, as when it states:  
In one sense, of course, it can be said that the 1972 Act is the source of EU law, in 
that, without that Act, EU law would have no domestic status. But in a more 
fundamental sense and, we consider a more realistic sense, where EU law applies in 
the United Kingdom, it is the EU institutions which are the relevant source of that 
law.123 
                                                          
119 Note 117 above, at 88. It will be noted that the prerogative does not figure in this list of 
sources; this is presumably because MacCormick classifies it as part of the common law. 
Ecclesiastical law could also be listed separately.  
120 Namely the Scotland Act 1998 and subsequent legislation; Robert Craig at 000.  
121 McCormick was clear that the 1972 Act had brought about a change to the rule of 
recognition, albeit one that could be reversed if Parliament decided subsequently to repeal 
or modify the ECA: note 117 above at 88. 
122 Which, per s 3(1) ECA, were rendered binding on UK courts.  
123 Miller at [61].  
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It may be however that the perception of a contradiction here flows from the attempt to 
apply strict dualism to a system that is designed to transcend it. As Tom Poole argues,124 the 
majority were seeking in their analysis to move beyond simple dualism, in an attempt to 
recognise the sui generis nature of EU law as it operates in the UK. The ECA is unique in its 
effects, doing something no other statute has done: it allows a foreign source of law to pour 
directly into UK law and take effect as domestic law. Moreover neither that statute, nor any 
other UK law or institution, has control over the content of that law. EU law is thus 
‘independent’ in the sense that its content is determined not by any UK institutions but by 
an independent external source – the EU institutions. For example, when a new EU 
Regulation is passed by the EU institutions it takes immediate and full effect in UK law; not 
only is no action by any part of the UK legal system required for it to have that effect, but its 
interpretation is also not governed by domestic law: rulings of the CJEU are binding on UK 
courts and reference must be made to that Court where the meaning or requirements of EU 
law are unclear. Hence EU law takes effect as an ‘independent’ source of UK law in the very 
real senses that both its content and its interpretation are determined outside the UK legal 
system, by the EU institutions. One meaning of the word ‘source’ is ‘origin’ and it seems 
clear that this was the sense in which the Supreme Court was using it.  To insist that the only 
relevant source of EU law is the ECA misses, as Poole observes, the distinctive, sui generis 
nature of the ECA (and, one might add, of EU law itself). It also, as he points out, conflates 
the notion of ‘the point of origin of a norm’ and its authorisation – ‘the act or process by 
whose warrant or say-so the norm is binding.‘125 
But there is a broader point here. There may appear something rather myopic in the 
insistence that, as Elliott puts it, ‘EU law is…a body of law that has whatever domestic effect 
is provided for by the ECA and whatever domestic status it is accorded by that legislation.’ It 
is true in one sense – Poole’s sense of ‘authorisation’.  But it is also important to consider 
the broader question of why the ECA was designed as it was. Because it is not the case that 
                                                          
124 Poole, note 13 above at 701-02.  
125 Poole’s point is that the majority disambiguates these two meanings of the word ‘source’ 
and that even the authorisation of EU law is dependent both upon the Treaties and the ECA: 
note 13 above at 702.    
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Parliament happened to choose to give effect to EU law in the way that it did. Rather two 
key pre-existing doctrines of EU law – direct effect and primacy –themselves shaped the 
design of the ECA. Thus it was the fact that EU law requires its own immediate effect in 
domestic law that led section 2(1) to be drafted in the way that it was, to ensure precisely 
that. And it was because EU law requires that it be given primacy over national law that 
section 2(4) was drafted to give directly effective EU law priority not only over previous but 
also subsequent statutes. In this sense, the insistence of the minority in Miller and their 
academic supporters that the whole thing is about a British statute risks losing sight of the 
bigger picture about the unique interrelationship between EU and domestic law. In contrast 
the majority was seeking to grapple – however imperfectly – with the unique nature and 
source of EU law and the fact that, in a very real sense, its status is attributable not just to 
the ECA but to those core requirements of the EU legal order that themselves shaped the 
ECA. 
It should also be noticed that there is a tension – if not perhaps an outright 
contradiction – in the way that the minority and its supporters treat the status of EU law. On 
the one hand, as we have seen, in seeking to attack the reasoning of the majority, they are 
keen to stress that EU law cannot be counted as a separate source of law since it is 
dependent on statute for its effect. But at other times, as seen above, they are concerned to 
stress that, despite being given effect by a UK statute, EU law rights should not be regarded 
as ‘statutory rights’ either. Thus we saw Elliott quote Lord Reed with approval saying:  ‘The 
1972 Act did not create statutory rights in the same sense as other statutes, but gave legal 
effect in the UK to a body of law now known as EU law’. Elliott therefore argues that ‘EU law 
is not domestic law in any normal or ultimate sense. Rather it forms a distinct body of law 
that has effect in domestic law, in the sense of being enforceable in national legal 
proceedings.’ 
But this insistence that what looks like statutory rights are really a distinct body of 
EU law rights that are merely given effect by a domestic statute looks close to a concession 
that EU law rights really are a separate source of law – the very thing they deny. In this way 
Elliott and the minority appear to want to have it both ways: EU law is said to be a separate 
(‘distinct’) body of law when they want to argue that it does not give rise to domestic 
statutory rights. But when they want to attack the Supreme Court for saying the ECA gives 
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rise to a new source of law they insist that it’s not a separate source - because it only has 
effect via the ECA. This is not necessarily an outright contradiction, but it does leave unclear 
exactly what status they regard EU law rights as having: not statutory or domestic but 
equally not a separate source of non-domestic law. Insisting that it is ‘a distinct body of law 
that has effect in domestic law’ but is not itself domestic law does not really advance the 
matter.  
C. A volte face by the UK courts?  
 Before leaving this issue it is worth considering a very different perspective – that of 
Jo Murkens, who argues that in denying that EU law only has effect in the UK through a UK 
statute, and in characterising EU law as a ‘separate and independent’ source of law, the 
Supreme Court has ‘thrown…[UK constitutional] orthodoxy out of the window.’126 Murkens 
claims that this ‘astonishing’ feature of the judgment amounts to the Supreme Court 
‘aligning its case law with the ECJ’s famous words in Costa that ‘…the law stemming from 
the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original 
nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions’.127 This I think is plainly going too far. 
While it is true that a couple of sentences of the majority judgment, particular where it 
characterises EU law as ‘as an entirely new, independent and overriding source of domestic 
law’,128 could sound reminiscent of the CJEU’s view,129 there are two key ways in which the 
UKSC’s view diverges sharply and significantly from that of the European Court.  
 First, Murkens is not quite right when he suggests that the majority makes the claim 
that ‘the validity of EU law does not originate from the ECA.’130  What the majority actually 
says is that, in one sense, ‘the 1972 Act is the source of EU law, in that, without that Act, EU 
law would have no domestic status’ but that it is more realistic to acknowledge the 
‘originating source’ of EU law as the EU institutions. Murkens summarises the judgment as 
saying that ‘the effect of the Act is to “constitute” EU law as ‘an independent and overriding 
source of domestic law,’ remarking that ‘a better term would be “to recognise”’. But this is a 
                                                          
126 Murkens note 14 above, at 686, 687.   
127 Murkens, ibid, at 688, citing Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585.  
128 Miller at [80].  
129 As Murkens points out, what the majority says could be seen as in tension with the 
statement in section 18 of the European Union Act 2011 that EU law is applicable and 
effective in the UK ‘only by virtue of’ the ECA.  
130 Murkens note 14 above, at 688.  
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little mischievous: to ‘recognise’ something is not at all the same as to ‘constitute’ it and it is 
tolerably clear that the Supreme Court meant the latter, given its admission that, without 
the ECA, ‘EU law would have no domestic status’. This admission alone differentiates the UK 
view from that of the CJEU, for whom direct effect should be independent of any even 
general implementing measures, such as the ECA.131 The majority’s view that repeal of the 
ECA would render EU no longer effective in the UK is flatly contrary to this.  
But perhaps even more significantly, having acknowledged that the ECA gives EU law 
a status above ordinary legislation, the Supreme Court says very clearly that:  
‘legislation which alters the domestic constitutional status of EU institutions or of EU 
law is not constrained by the need to be consistent with EU law. In the case of such 
legislation, there is no question of EU law having primacy, so that such legislation will 
have domestic effect even if it infringes EU law (and that would be true whether or 
not the 1972 Act remained in force’.132  
 
This is wholly contrary to the CJEU’s consistent view133 that EU law takes precedence even 
over fundamental constitutional norms of a member statute. This section of the judgment 
makes plain that the force allowed for EU law within the UK system is wholly dependent 
upon that given to it by the UK Parliament, which remains completely free to ‘infringe’ EU 
law in this respect when it so wishes. This is a flat contradiction of the CJEU’s ‘crystal clear’ 
view that ‘national courts cannot disapply – let alone invalidate – [EU] law’. 134  
                                                          
131 As appears from the same classic statement of direct effect in Costa v ENEL: ‘the [EU] 
Treaty has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became 
an integral part of the legal systems of the member states and which their courts are bound 
to apply’ (Costa v ENEL (Case C-6/64) [1964] ECR 585, 593): equally important is the famous 
statement that ‘independently of the legislation of member states, [EU] law therefore not 
only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights 
which become part of their legal heritage’ (Van Gend en Loos (Case C-26/62) [1963] ECR 1, 
12 (emphasis added)).  
132 Miller at [67]. 
133 Developed from Internationale Handeslsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsselle fur 
Getreide und Futtermittel (Case 11/70) [1970 ECR 1125.   
134 Robert Schuetze, European Constitutional Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2nd ed, 2016) at 131 
(summarising the ‘Foto-Frost doctrine’).    
37 
 
 Thus Murkens’ argument that the irony of Miller lies in a belated acceptance by UK 
courts of the CJEU’s view of the primacy of EU law – just as the UK was leaving – is 
unconvincing. On the contrary, the judgment of the majority may be seen as charting a 
skilful and nuanced path between simple notions of parliamentary sovereignty on the one-
hand and the full blooded, unconditional supremacy of EU law even over national 
constitutions long-claimed by the CJEU. 
V. THE ARGUMENT FROM CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
As discussed earlier, the second aspect of the Supreme Court’s judgment that has 
caused controversy is the ‘constitutional change’ argument. Withdrawal from the EU, said 
the majority, would bring about ‘a major change to UK constitutional arrangements’135 and 
the majority ‘cannot accept’ that this ‘can be achieved by a minister alone; it must be 
effected in the only way that the UK constitution recognises, namely by Parliamentary 
legislation.’ Indeed, said the majority, it would be contrary to ‘long-standing and 
fundamental principle’ for such a far-reaching constitutional change to be brought about by 
the Executive without express legislative endorsement.136 Moreover, the majority appeared 
to attach considerable importance to this argument, observing that: ‘the main difficulty with 
the [Government’s] argument is that it does not answer the objection based on the 
constitutional implications of withdrawal from the EU.’137 
 Mark Elliott has strongly criticised this notion, arguing that it:  
lacks support in authority, imports into the law a novel and highly imprecise criterion 
by which prerogative power is delimited and rests upon normative constitutional 
foundations that are unarticulated and arguably absent.138  
Elliott’s criticism has some limited force. Given that the majority described this principle as 
‘long-standing’ it is unfortunate that they saw fit to cite no authority for it139 – although this 
                                                          
135 Miller at [82].  
136 Ibid at [81] and [82]. 
137 ibid at [81] (emphasis added).  
138 Elliott, note 12 above at 258.  
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may be because they did not see it as establishing a new principle at all. More importantly, 
perhaps, it remains unclear whether these dicta are intended to introduce a new and free-
standing restriction on the use of prerogative power or whether they serve rather to drive 
home the basic frustration argument – strengthening it by pointing out the sheer scale of 
the change to domestic law that would be brought about by withdrawal. It may be that that 
the majority were simply making the point that, given use of the prerogative may not 
change domestic law, it can be taken as a fortiori that it cannot alter the domestic legal 
order – the constitution  itself. Used this way the principle could simply be one that 
operated as a way of resolving any ambiguities thrown up by the operation of the 
frustration principle: if there were doubt as to whether it applied, the fact that the exercise 
of the prerogative in question could fairly be said to amount to a change of constitutional 
importance would be a factor counting against use of the prerogative. If the Supreme Court 
intended only the latter, then Elliott’s criticism loses much of its force. First, no new 
authority would be needed for such a proposition; second, its alleged novelty and lack of 
precision would not matter if it were never intended to function as a free-standing, 
additional restriction on use of the prerogative, but rather as a supplement to, or 
refinement of, the well-established frustration principle.  Certainly the majority may fairly 
be criticised for leaving that issue unclear, but that is a rather different matter. In what 
follows, I will first consider whether the ‘constitutional change’ argument can function as a 
free-standing one.  I will then seek to shed light on the notion by using a comparative 
constitutional perspective, suggesting that it is worthy of – at the least – serious academic 
consideration. I will aim to start that debate – and in doing so, seek to supply the omission 
of the majority by suggesting an underpinning justification for such a principle.  
An initial point should be clarified at the outset. It is well known that the UK 
constitution consists not only of legal rules but also of constitutional conventions: these are 
non-legal norms, not enforced by the courts,140 several of which are of great importance. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
139 As Elliott rather acidly observes, ‘given that the majority asserted the principle “followed 
from the ordinary application of basic concepts of constitutional law to the present issue”, it 
is unfortunate that [they] did not see fit to identify those concepts’ (ibid at 264).  
140  The Supreme Court quoted the classic statement by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re 
Resolution to Amend the Constitution [1981] 1 SCR 753, at 853, per Estey and MacIntyre JJ: 
‘A fundamental difference between the legal…rules of the constitution, and the 
conventional rules is that, while a breach of the legal rules…has a legal consequence in that 
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For example, the rule that the Queen must appoint as Prime Minister, and thus head of the 
government, the person best able to command the confidence of the House of Commons is 
an absolutely core rule of the UK constitution – and it is a convention only. One could thus 
object to the proposition in Miller that the Executive may not bring about major 
‘constitutional change’ by noting that such change can be brought about through changing a 
constitutional convention – and the Executive branch (either Ministers or the Queen herself) 
can bring about such a change, through the way they exercise their prerogative powers.141 
This then would be an example of the Executive branch having changed a (non-legal) norm 
of the constitution. Plainly it would be contrary to the nature of conventions themselves 
were courts to cite such a change as grounds to castigate use of the prerogative as unlawful. 
As Miller itself confirmed in relation to the Sewel Convention, concerning respect for the 
sphere of competence of the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, the courts can take cognisance of, but may not directly enforce, constitutional 
conventions.142 Hence it is sensible to read the ‘constitutional change’ principle in Miller as 
being confined to changes to legal rules of the constitution, which are after all the normal 
concern of the courts.  
A. A free-standing or a parasitic principle?  
It is immediately apparent that this limiting condition strongly qualifies any notion 
that the ‘constitutional change’ principle could operate as a separate, free-standing ground 
of challenge. For, as noted above, it is already settled law that use of the prerogative may 
not change domestic law (whether statute or common law). Therefore if use of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
it will be restrained by the courts, no such sanction exists for breach or non-observance of 
the conventional rules. The observance of constitutional conventions depends upon the 
acceptance of the obligation of conformance by the actors deemed to be bound thereby’ 
(quoted in Miller at [142]).  
141 A historical example is the gradual emergence of a convention during the early 20th 
Century that it is the Prime Minister alone (not the Cabinet) who can request a dissolution 
of Parliament. This emerged in the context of the exercise of the (former) prerogative of 
dissolution. There is no formal method of changing a constitutional convention, since such a 
rule simply consists of an agreed-upon way of doing things, backed by precedent and the 
belief amongst those who work the constitution that it is the right way to do things. They 
therefore can change simply through a change in constitutional behaviour being adopted, 
which subsequently gains acceptance by other relevant political actors.  
142 Miller at [146]. 
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prerogative modified a legal rule with constitutional content it would already have fallen 
foul of this long-standing rule, and the fact that it had made a change of constitutional 
significance could only function as an additional reason for finding against it. In other cases, 
where the change made to domestic law was small in scale, or in some other way not clearly 
established, the ‘constitutional change’ argument might help resolve ambiguity as to 
whether the legal change was de minimis or not. This might apply where either use of the 
prerogative would affect the operation of a minor provision of an Act of Parliament, but not 
be clearly contrary to it;143  it might also apply if such use appeared contrary to, or in tension 
with a common law rule, but the scope – and perhaps even existence – of that rule was 
unclear. In such circumstances, the argument could operate as guidance: it would be a 
factor weighing in the balance against use of the prerogative if doing so would bring about a 
change of constitutional significance.  It would thus function as a guiding light to the court 
where the application of the ordinary principles governing use of the prerogative yielded no 
clear-cut result.  
It is important also to emphasise that this is how the argument must have functioned 
in Miller itself. In Miller the use of the constitutional change argument was wholly 
dependent upon – indeed flowed from – the court’s prior finding that a statute of major 
constitutional importance (the ECA) would be rendered a dead letter by use of the 
prerogative to trigger Article 50. In other words, the major constitutional change that the 
majority was referring to in Miller was nothing more or less than the frustration of a 
particularly important statute – and the consequent loss of the substantial set of rights to 
which that statute gave effect. Thus the argument could not have operated in a free-
standing way in Miller itself, because the constitutional change in question consisted of 
rendering a constitutional statute nugatory.  It also would also of course have brought about 
a major change in domestic law – again, a separate and long-established limitation upon use 
of the prerogative. Thus it seems fairly clear that when Elliott suggests that the principle 
may be characterised as meaning that  
                                                          
143 Withdrawal from the ECHR, for example, would not be contrary to any express provision 
in the Human Rights Act but would leave some minor provisions with nothing further to do: 
one example is section 14, which provides a procedure for approving derogations from the 
Convention at the domestic level. Several other examples are discussed by the author in a 
forthcoming article with Alison Young: note 76 above.   
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use of the prerogative…is now constrained not only by established principles [but] 
also by its incapacity to do things that have a degree of constitutional significance 
beyond a given threshold144 
he is positing an implausible reading given the facts of Miller itself.   
 It follows therefore that even if Miller could be read as suggesting that the 
constitutional change principle could apply independently of the frustration of any statute, 
that suggestion would be, strictly speaking, obiter dicta, since that was not the position in 
Miller itself. Indeed it appears likely that most cases will involve circumstances in which it is 
claimed that use of the prerogative would affect either statute or common law. After all, if 
(as affirmed above) we are talking about change to a legal rule of the constitution (not a 
conventional one) then in nearly all cases the claimant would necessarily have already 
identified a change to either statute or common law; hence there would be no question of 
applying the constitutional change principle in a free-standing way. It would probably only 
be in rare cases that circumstances arose in which it could be claimed with any plausibility 
that use of the prerogative would bring about a legal change of constitutional significance 
but somehow not change either statute or common law.  
Two possible examples come to mind. The first is where the Executive proposed 
withdrawing from a treaty and judicial reference to that treaty had become a significant 
factor either in developing the common law or statutory interpretation145 in an area of 
constitutional importance. In such a case it would be possible to argue against use of the 
prerogative to procure withdrawal on the ground that a change to the constitution would 
                                                          
144 Elliott acknowledges that it is not clear what the principle means, but concludes that it is 
implausible to regard it as applying only to changes of the scale of EU withdrawal:  note 12 
above at 264-66.  
145 There is a general principle of statutory interpretation that the UK is assumed not to 
intend to legislate so as to undermine its obligations in international law (see, e.g. R (Brind) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1991] 1 A.C. 696. A recent example is 
Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2012] 2 AC 471 where at [122] Lord Dyson said: 
“there is no doubt that there is a ‘strong presumption’ in favour of interpreting an English 
statute in a way which does not place the United Kingdom in breach of its international 
obligations’. Similarly, ambiguities in the common law can be resolved in a way that upholds 
such obligations: Derbyshire County Council v Times Newspapers Ltd [1993] AC 534.  
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come about through loss of the ability of the courts to use the Treaty as an interpretive aid 
in domestic-law adjudication.146 
A second example arises from the possibility of a future UK withdrawal from the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which is given domestic effect via the Human Rights 
Act. In a forthcoming article with Alison Young147the author discusses whether, were the 
Human Rights Act still to be in force, withdrawal from the Convention could be seen as 
‘frustrating’ that Act, and/or causing the loss of domestic rights under it. But there is also 
the quite separate issue that, leaving aside the Act, withdrawal would also bring about two 
changes that could be argued to be of constitutional significance in the UK: the loss of the 
right of individuals to petition the Strasbourg Court under Article 34 ECHR and the ending of 
the UK’s current obligation under Article 46 to comply with adverse judgments of that 
Court.  The orthodox response to any challenge to withdrawal on these grounds would be to 
argue that both the right of UK citizens to individual petition and the UK’s Article 46 
obligation were created purely by prerogative action on the international plane and so can 
be removed by it. Given that neither of these things are creatures of domestic law (and are 
certainly not the creation of any statute) it would not be possible to argue that their loss 
changed domestic law or frustrated any statute; any argument that the right of UK 
citizens148 to petition the Strasbourg was a de facto domestic law right would also probably 
fail. Hence the only argument that could be brought to challenge these aspects of 
withdrawal would be that these two changes were of sufficient constitutional significance as 
to require explicit authorisation by Parliament. At that point, a court would have to consider 
whether the ‘constitutional change’ principle articulated in Miller could be deployed as a 
ground of challenge in itself to use of the prerogative to withdraw from the ECHR. Standing 
in the way of such acceptance would, of course, be the standard view that decisions taken 
                                                          
146 And see the remarkable judgment of Lord Kerr in R (SG) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2015] UKSC 16, [235]-[262], in which his Lordship decides that Article 3(1) of the 
UN Convention ‘is directly enforceable in UK domestic law’ despite the absence of 
incorporating legislation. Withdrawal from that Convention could then be said to cause a 
change in domestic law.  
147 See note 76 above.  
148 The right of course also applies to all those in the jurisdiction of the UK.  
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under the foreign affairs prerogative are non-justiciable;149 the response would have to be 
that the challenge was not to the international dimension of the action taken but to its 
effect upon the UK constitutional order: in particular to the loss of the individual right of 
those within the jurisdiction of the UK to petition the Strasbourg Court. Whether such an 
argument would or could succeed is beyond the scope of this article: the point for present 
purposes is that it would be only in rare circumstances like these that the constitutional 
change argument could be used in a truly free-standing way. In Miller – whatever 
possibilities it generates for the future – it was not.  
Finally, to return to Elliott’s ‘uncertainty’ criticism, it must be conceded that this 
aspect of the reasoning of the Supreme Court has introduced some uncertainty into the law. 
However some uncertainly is nearly always generated by constitutional innovation. The 
notion of ‘constitutional statutes’ itself introduced considerable uncertainty, not least 
because the definition proposed by Laws LJ is extremely vague;150 and yet Elliott who, as we 
saw above, was so critical of the uncertainty of the ‘constitutional scale’ argument in Miller, 
has been enthusiastic not just about this innovation but about the suggestion in HS2151 that 
there may be hierarchy within constitutional statutes.152 Whatever the merits of such a 
suggestion, it certainly adds further uncertainty to an already uncertain doctrine.   
B. A possible normative foundation  
The above analysis has explained why the constitutional change argument was not applied 
in a free-standing way in Miller and could only rarely, if ever, be so applied. That in itself 
                                                          
149 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 417, per Lord 
Roskill; see recently dicta of Lord Kerr, note 146 above at [237].  
150 Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] 1 CMLR 50, in which Laws LJ defined a 
constitutional statute as ‘one which (a) conditions the legal relationship between citizen and 
State in some general, overarching manner, or (b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what 
we would now regard as fundamental constitutional rights.’ Category (a) is notoriously 
vague.  
151 R (HS2 Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] UKSC 3, at [207].  
152 The suggestion was that both the European Communities Act and Article 9 of the Bill of 
Rights are ‘constitutional’ in status, but that the latter might well rank higher, and thus not 
be capable of being displaced by the 1972 Act. Elliott described HS2 as proposing ‘a far 
richer constitutional order in which the differential normative claims of constitutional and 
other measures fall to be recognised and calibrated in legal terms.’ 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/01/23/mark-elliot-reflections-on-the-hs2-case-a-
hierarchy-of-domestic-constitutional-norms-and-the-qualified-primacy-of-eu-law/ 
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goes some way to answering Elliott’s criticism of the uncertainly of a criterion that relies on 
prohibiting something that is far along enough on a ‘scale’ of constitutional importance. 153It 
is notable however that Elliott makes no attempt to consider the cogency of the opposite 
contention to the one he criticises: that it is perfectly appropriate and unproblematic for the 
prerogative to be used to bring about major constitutional change. In asserting so forcibly 
that the ‘normative foundation’ for a prohibition on use of the prerogative to make such 
changes ‘is, at best, obscure’,154 Elliott at least gives the impression that he would regard 
such use of the prerogative as unproblematic. But before endorsing such a notion it would 
be worth doing two things that Elliott does not: first considering why joining / withdrawing 
from the EU might be regarded as a change of constitutional importance; second asking 
ourselves whether there is any reason to regard use of executive powers to change the 
constitution with suspicion.  
Let us recall then what happened when the UK joined the EU - this remarkable 
international organisation, which demands both that its laws take direct effect in the states’ 
domestic laws (contrary to the core domestic precept of dualism) and that they are superior 
in normative force to domestic law (contrary to the UK doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty). The argument made here is that, in order to bring this about, the UK 
Parliament crafted a statute that gave effect to both of these revolutionary demands – and 
in doing so clearly changed the constitution.155  
Perhaps strangely, this basic but important point has gone rather unrecognised – 
which is perhaps why the Supreme Court felt the need to point it out. Since the UK has no 
codified constitution it is not always readily apparent when it is being amended, simply 
because it is changed the way ordinary law is changed – through Acts of Parliament, through 
                                                          
153 It should be noticed that the notion of a ‘scale’ is Elliott’s – it is not a term that appears in 
the judgment. 
154 Elliott, note 12 above, at 268.  
155 Ekins in a recent note critiquing Miller, suggests that the UK Government would itself 
have fallen foul of any such ‘constitutional change’ principle by using the prerogative to join 
the EU, which was ‘an act of immense constitutional significance’: Ekins, note 85 above at 
351. But this is misconceived: joining was of such significance precisely because of the 
‘revolutionary demands’ that entry made upon UK law; but those demands were only given 
effect via statute - the ECA. Thus the passage of the ECA itself complied with the Miller 
principle that major (legal) changes to the constitution may only be brought about by 
statute.  
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changes to common law and in myriad other ways. But the key point is that the 1972 Act, on 
any sensible view, amounted in effect to a constitutional amendment – and a very 
important one. And since withdrawal from the EU logically therefore also entails re-
amending the constitution, what Elliott appears to be arguing is that the Government may 
use the prerogative to make major changes to the UK constitution.  
The argument can be illustrated from the experience of other European states – 
states with codified Constitutions. Many of these countries, either on joining the EU, or at 
least after the Treaty of Maastricht established the European Union, had to amend their 
constitutions as a result; examples include Ireland, Austria, Spain, Hungary, France and 
Germany.156 While some countries, like the Netherlands157 did not, this was because their 
constitutions were monist, containing explicit provision allowing for treaty law to take effect 
in domestic law and to override inconsistent domestic law158 – hence already satisfying 
these basic twin conditions of EU membership.  
The argument then is that it was the same for the UK: the constitution had to change 
to accommodate membership; but absent a formal process of constitutional change that 
came about simply by statute - the ECA. But that provided for what was still a dramatic 
change in a monist British constitution still governed by Diceyan orthodoxy, in which 
Parliament cannot bind its successors so that the later statute always prevails over any 
inconsistent provisions in an earlier one.  As discussed earlier, section 2(4) of the ECA 
provided that future statutes would not impliedly repeal inconsistent provisions of EU law 
or the ECA that gave them effect; instead they would take effect ‘subject to’ the 
requirements of directly effective EU law. How significant this was only became apparent 
when the famous Factortame litigation arose, and the UK courts ‘disapplied’ a statute 
                                                          
156 The relevant amendments are as follows: Constitution of Ireland: Third Amendment; 
Austrian Constitution: multiple amendments made upon accession to the EU in 1995; 
Spanish Constitution: amendment to Article 13(2) (consequent upon Maastricht); Hungary: 
multiple amendments made to allow for membership (17 December, 2002); French 
Constitution: Amendment of 1992 (consequent upon the Maastricht Treaty); German 
Constitution, Article 23 (added by amendment).    
157 Denmark, like the Netherlands, found a ‘home’ for the role of EU law in an existing 
provision of the Constitution, namely Article 20; the same applied initially in relation to the 
Italian Constitution (Article 11) but, following a constitutional amendment in 2001 a new 
Article 117 was added to the Constitution to expressly deal with EU membership.      
158 Article 92 of the Constitution for the Kingdom of the Netherlands; see also Article 91(3).  
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passed 16 years after the ECA – the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, because of its 
incompatibility with EU law. And when that happened it was immediately recognised as a 
moment of profound constitutional change. In fact the attempt to grapple with how it was 
that a court had been able to disapply a statute for the first time in order to allow for the 
primacy of EU law spawned an entirely fresh jurisprudential creation – the ‘constitutional 
statute’.159 And this in turn overturned more than a century of allegiance to Dicey’s flat 
normative landscape in which the Dentist Act 1887 and Bill of Rights 1688 have exactly the 
same status.160  
Thus the effect of the ECA – the conduit that carries EU law into the UK – was 
profound indeed. Not only did a vast flood of EU law in the form of thousands of pages of 
Regulations, and of foundational principles in the Treaties like non-discrimination flow into 
the UK legal system, in such quantity and significance that it is widely acknowledged that 
unpicking it will take government lawyers many years of work. But at the same time the 
constitution itself was radically changed: the traditional doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty – its very bedrock – was, as we have just seen, significantly modified; dualism 
was overcome, hierarchies of statutes were established for the first time, and British courts 
become bound when applying EU law by the rulings of an international court.161 Thus when 
the CJEU decided that a centuries-old rule forbidding the granting of injunctions against 
Ministers of the Crown must be discarded, in order to ensure the practical as well as the 
normative supremacy of EU law as against domestic law162, the UK courts obediently 
accepted and applied the ruling.163  
This amounts, on any standard, to major constitutional change. Hence reversing it – 
by withdrawing the UK from the EU – would too. And that brings us to the next point - 
                                                          
159 Postulated in Thoburn and accepted in dicta of the Supreme Court in H v Lord Advocate 
[2012] UKSC 24, at [32], per Lord Hope, and R (HS2 Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for 
Transport [2014] UKSC 3, esp at [207].  
160 I borrow this vivid phrase from Elliott, who describes Dicey as envisaging ‘a constitutional 
landscape of unrelenting normative flatness’, in which the Act of Union and the Dentists Act 
1878 were both of equal status: note 152 above.  
161 By s. 3(1) ECA 1972, summarised above at 000.   
162 Case C-213/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame Ltd [1990] ECR I-
2433.  
163 Factortame (no 2), note 50 above.  
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which is that of course in virtually all democratic states, amending the constitution require a 
special procedure, typically extraordinary majorities in (both houses of) the legislature (as in 
Germany)164 or a binding referendum (as in Ireland).165  And this brings us to the heart of 
the point the majority may have been seeking to highlight in Miller. Consider for a moment 
some basic principles deriving from the separation of powers in the light of Lord Diplock’s 
well-known observation, ‘… it cannot be too strongly emphasised that the British 
constitution, though largely unwritten, is firmly based on the separation of powers.’166 If 
there is a conceptual distinction between the roles of the executive and the legislature it 
must surely be that the former takes action within the existing legal framework while the 
latter changes that framework.  While it is common for the Executive to exercise delegated 
legislative powers, when doing so it is acting within an authority granted by the legislature 
for a specific purpose and thus ultimately controlled by the legislature. Absent such 
authorisation the Executive may not change domestic law.167 This is the basis of the 
separation of powers – reflected in the core principle governing the Executive prerogative 
powers, that ‘since the 17th century the prerogative has not empowered the Crown to 
change English common law or statute law.’168 
This begins to give us a sense of what the majority may have had in mind. As we 
have seen, it follows from the Separation of Powers that the Executive cannot even make 
ordinary legislation. That power – of changing the general law – is reserved to, and is the 
special competence of, the legislature. But in nearly all countries the constitution sits at a 
higher level still: it cannot be changed through ordinary legislation; instead a special process 
                                                          
164 Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, Article 79.   
165 The Constitution of Ireland, Articles 46 and 47  
166 Duport Steel v Sirs [1980] 1 All ER 529, 540. 
167 There are strictly limited exceptions: R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs [2009] AC 453 deals with a colonial prerogative power to legislate 
for overseas territories. Another exception may relate to the former prerogative to manage 
the Civil Service; but see discussion of this in Phillipson, note 87 above.  Another is where 
use of the prerogative changes the facts to which the law relates. In Miller, the majority 
mention Post Office v Estuary Radio Ltd [1968] 2 QB 740 in which exercise of  the 
prerogative to extend UK territorial waters ‘resulted in the criminalisation of broadcasts 
from ships in the extended area, which had previously been lawful’: Miller at [53].  
168 Ibid at [44].   
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of constitutional amendment is required. 169 We can thus sketch a basic three-level 
constitutional hierarchy: at the first level, Executive action (which may involve delegated or 
subordinate law-making); 170  at the second, primary legislative change; at the third, 
constitutional amendment. Using this analysis enables one to see how startling the claim of 
the minority in the Supreme Court and their academic supporters is: that the government 
may use the executive prerogative powers to do something that is two levels above its 
normal area of competence – operate at the third level and make a major change to the 
constitution. And this despite the fact that it is long-established constitutional doctrine that 
it may not use the prerogative at only the second level to change ordinary law. That, It is 
suggested, is the proposition that the Supreme Court said we can be confident in 
rejecting.171 
C. An objection: the UK constitution is different.  
An obvious objection to the analysis above is that it disregards the special nature of 
the UK constitution.172 Yes, in other countries, change to the constitution requires a special 
procedure, precisely because their constitutions sit above ordinary legislation in the legal 
hierarchy. But in the UK the constitution consists merely of ordinary legislation, common 
law principles, conventions and the like: it has no special status and there is no special 
procedure for amending it. It is of course correct to say that the UK has no codified 
constitution with special status as its European counterparts do. However the proposition 
that constitutional laws in the UK have no special status and may be changed exactly like 
                                                          
169 Some parts of a Constitution may be un-amendable by any means: well known examples 
are those in the German Constitution upholding human dignity (Article 1) and the federal, 
democratic nature of the State (Article 20) both of which are excluded from the amendment 
procedure under Article 79(3).  
170 Including the making of bye-laws by local authorities.  
171 One might also ask why it is permissible for the courts but not the Executive branch to 
change the constitution, as they undoubtedly do (a question raised by Jeff King during 
discussion of an early version of this paper at ICON-S, Copenhagen, 2017). The legitimacy 
and extent of the courts’ role in introducing constitutional innovation is of course fiercely 
contested, but the simplest answer is that long-standing principle forbids the Executive from 
making using of the prerogative to change domestic law and this article argues that the 
‘constitutional change’ argument is simply a refinement of this principle; in contrast, no 
such prohibition has ever applied to the courts, whose creative role, especially when 
developing the common law, is widely accepted.  
172 Aileen Kavanagh raised this point during discussion at ICON-S.  
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any other is dated and no longer accurate: it ignores the process by which the courts have 
steadily introduced important distinctions according special status both to certain 
fundamental rights and to certain statutes that embody such rights, or important 
constitutional principles. A few examples from the case-law will illustrate the point.  
The operation of the first kind of constraint may be seen in the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Ahmed v HM Treasury.173 The Court found that the Government could not use 
Orders in Council (a form of delegated legislation) made under the United Nations Act 1946 
to implement a UN Security Council Resolution by introducing draconian asset-freezing 
powers to be used against terrorist suspects. This was in spite of the very broad wording of 
the enabling power in s 1(1) of the United Nations Act 1946, which authorised the 
enactment of Orders in Council ‘when this is ‘necessary or expedient’ for the purpose of 
giving effect to UN Security Council Resolutions– precisely what the Government was doing. 
However, the court found that it was for the ‘very reason’ that the statutory words were so 
general that they should be read as being ‘susceptible to the presumption, in the absence of 
express words or necessary implication to the contrary, that they were intended to be 
subject to the basic rights of the individual’174 (in this case the right of access to the courts 
to challenge the freezing orders, which the Justices described as having a ‘devastating’ 
effect on those subject to them).175 In words very reminiscent of Miller, Lord Hope 
commented that this ‘a clear example of an attempt to adversely affect the basic rights of 
the citizen without the clear authority of Parliament’,176 while Lord Rodgers agreed that only 
Parliament could authorise such grave interferences with individual rights: ‘the 
democratically elected Parliament, rather than the executive, should make the final 
decision’.177  
 Ahmed did not involve use of the prerogative but it is similar to Miller in this respect: 
both cases involved the courts construing limits on Executive power when its threatened 
exercised would otherwise have intruded on fundamental rights (common law rights of 
property and access to a court in Ahmed; EU law rights in Miller). In Ahmed this was brought 
                                                          
173 [2010] UK SC 2. 
174 Ibid at [249], per Lord Mance.  
175  Ibid at [60], per Lord Hope. 
176 Ibid at [61]. 
177 Ibid at [186]. 
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about through construction of a broad enabling power in legislation; in Miller through 
interpretation of common law rules governing the interplay between statute and 
prerogative power but both the end result and the principle applied were the same: 178 
Executive power may not be used to remove or undermine constitutionally significant 
rights. The key point is that in Ahmed it was the constitutional significance of the rights at 
stake that drove the courts’ interpretation of the enabling statute. Words that would 
otherwise have been found easily broad enough to authorise the rules made by Ministers 
were read down so as to preclude them. Given that it was the significance that the common 
law constitution afforded to the rights in play that produced the result, it turned out that 
the uncodified UK constitution – in this case in the form of common law rights – could not 
be changed by the use of Executive powers. This has become part of a broader ‘principle of 
legality’ whereby, in the words of Lord Hoffmann, ‘fundamental rights cannot be overridden 
by general or ambiguous [statutory] words.’179 
 Thus Ahmed was only an example of a broader constitutional doctrine more 
explicitly invoked in Miller: that there are certain constitutional rights and statutes that 
require the special protection of the courts. Whereas in other jurisdictions this may amount 
to a power of constitutional review of legislation with strike-down powers,180 in the UK this 
has thus far only amounted to a power to insist that any restrictions on rights or 
constitutional principles deemed fundamental be expressly authorised by legislation. Where 
such express words are absent, the courts have been prepared to deploy sometimes very 
strong interpretive powers to ‘read down’ general legislative provisions. 
Ahmed thus serves as a good example of the courts protecting constitutionally 
significant rights from Executive incursion. Evans181  provides an even more dramatic 
example but this time of the protection of a basic constitutional principle – the rule of law. 
In that case, the Supreme Court read down a provision in freedom of information legislation 
                                                          
178 And as the House of Lords observed in the seminal decision of GHCQ, the fact that the 
power exercised derives from prerogative instead of statute should not alter the citizen’s 
right to challenge it: Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 
374, 417.   
179  R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115, 13 1. 
180 Although not necessarily: no such power exists in the constitutions of Denmark or 
Sweden.  
181 R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21.  
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allowing Ministers to issue a veto that could override the decision of a tribunal ordering the 
release to the applicant of the information sought.182 Whereas the provision in question183 
appeared to give a broad discretion to the Minister to decide to withhold the information 
subject only to a requirement of reasonable grounds,184 a majority in the Supreme Court 
found there to be a constitutional principle in play: the rule of law principle that the 
Executive must abide by, and may not set aside, the decision of an independent judicial 
body. This they said was a principle so fundamental that it was displaceable only by the 
clearest words in a statute, which they found not to be present. Accordingly the power was 
read down extremely restrictively so that the Minister could only veto the Tribunal’s 
decision where there had been ‘a material change of circumstances’ or it was demonstrably 
flawed in fact or in law’, but for a technical reason could not be appealed.185 Evans is a 
controversial decision186  but for present purposes it is cited only as demonstrating clear 
precedent for the proposition that the scope of Executive power will be read down to 
prevent it from changing important constitutional principles. From this to the proposition in 
Miller that the particular Executive power vesting in the prerogative may not be used so as 
                                                          
182 The case concerned a prolonged dispute as to whether memos written by Prince Charles 
to various government departments giving his views on various aspects of public policy 
should be released under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 or not. Government 
departments all refused to release the documents, a decision upheld by the FOI 
Commissioner.  However, the Commissioner’s decision was challenged in, and overturned 
by the Upper Tribunal (a tribunal of equivalent status to the High Court) which ordered the 
release of the memos. Instead of appealing the Tribunal’s decision, the Government issued 
a veto under section 53 of the Freedom of the Information Act 2000. That veto was then 
successfully challenged by way of judicial review in a case that went up to the Supreme 
Court 
183 Section 53 of the 2000 Act provided that a Minister could issue the veto simply by  giving 
the Information Commissioner ‘a certificate signed by him stating that he has on reasonable 
grounds formed the opinion that, in respect of the request or requests concerned, there 
was no failure [to comply with the Act].’ 
184 Traditionally interpreted by courts as allowing for challenge by way of judicial role only 
when Wednesbury unreasonable – that is as falling wholly outside the range of responses 
open to a reasonable decision-maker.   
185 Evans, note 181 above, at [71]. Within the majority, the judgment of Lord Mance and 
Baroness Hale proposed a more moderate ‘reading-down’ of the veto.  
186 For critical discussion, see M. Elliott, ‘A Tangled Constitutional Web: The Black-Spider 
Memos and the British Constitution's Relational Architecture [2015] PL 539, 541; CJS Knight, 
‘The rule of law, parliamentary sovereignty and the ministerial veto’ (2015) 131(Oct) LQR 
547, 548; R. Craig ‘Black Spiders Weaving Webs: The Constitutional Implications of Executive 
Veto of Tribunal Determinations’ [2016] 79(1) MLR 166-182.   
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to make major changes to the constitution is a very short step indeed – indeed it may be 
seen simply as a rearticulation of the same principle, rather than any change to it.   
The above discussion has referred to the notion of ‘constitutional statutes’ – those 
considered by the courts to be of sufficient importance in their protection of fundamental 
rights or constitutional principles so as to require Parliament to repeal them expressly, if 
that is what it wishes to do,187 rather than allowing such statutes to be subject to the 
ordinary process of implied repeal whereby a later statute automatically ‘repeals’ an earlier 
one to the extent of any inconsistency. The first statute to be identified as having this 
importance was of course the European Communities Act itself and both the Divisional 
Court and the Supreme Court judgments in Miller referred to this. The Divisional Court 
made the strong point that given Parliament had given the ECA an elevated constitutional 
status above those of ordinary Acts of Parliament such that it could override – and displace 
– even the provisions of future Acts of Parliament,188 it was most unlikely that Parliament 
had intended that the prerogative – a source of legal authority that ranks below Acts of 
Parliament – could be used to render the ECA a dead letter. As the court put it: 
 
Since in enacting the ECA as a statute of major constitutional importance, Parliament 
has indicated it should be exempt from casual, implied repeal by Parliament itself, 
still less can it be thought to be likely that Parliament nonetheless intended that its 
legal effects could be removed by the Crown through the use of its prerogative 
powers’.189  
This may be seen as the precursor of the Supreme Court’s ‘constitutional change’ argument: 
indeed by identifying the ECA as a statute of ‘major constitutional importance’ and asserting 
that the prerogative could not be used to remove its legal effects, the lower court was 
making a very similar claim. The Supreme Court made similar observations about the 
significance of the ECA, noting that: 
                                                          
187 See note 159 above.  
188 Under section 2(4) ECA, applied in Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State (No 2) so as to set 
aside provisions in the later Merchant Shipping Act 1988 that were found to be 
incompatible with directly effective EU law given effect through the 1972 Act. See above at 
000.  
189 Note 25 above at [88] 
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it authorises a dynamic process by which, without further primary legislation (and, in 
some cases, even without any domestic legislation), EU law not only becomes a 
source of UK law, but actually takes precedence over all domestic sources of UK law, 
including statutes. [Thus]…in constitutional terms the effect of the 1972 Act was 
unprecedented.190 
 
The Supreme Court did not say in terms that the ECA was ‘a constitutional statute’; indeed it 
might be thought that its more cautious description of it as having ‘a constitutional 
character’ was meant to express demurral at the notion of constitutional statutes generally. 
However given that the court immediately goes on to say that the Act has a constitutional 
character ‘as discussed’ in various authorities and then gives the citation for the classic 
discussion of ‘constitutional statutes in those previous cases191  this seems unlikely.  Indeed 
it seems tolerably clear that the Supreme Court draws the same conclusion from the ECA’s 
special status as did the Divisional Court: it is found to reinforce the conclusion that 
Ministers acting alone cannot cut off the source of EU law from the UK because:  
 ‘the source in question was brought into existence by Parliament through primary 
legislation [the ECA], which gave that source an overriding supremacy in the 
hierarchy of domestic law sources.’ 
This aspect of the judgment has been subject to important criticism: that it is wrong 
to claim that Parliament can give an Act ‘constitutional status’ that sets aside the doctrine of 
implied repeal. This is said to be erroneous because contrary to certain well-known obiter 
dicta of Laws LJ in Thoburn v Sunderland City Council192 that only the common law may 
bestow such status. As Elliott and Hooper put it:  
 
In Thoburn, Laws LJ was at pains to emphasise that whether something is a 
constitutional statute is not a matter of parliamentary intention. Rather, it is a 
                                                          
190 Miller at [60] 
191 Laws LJ in Thoburn note 150 above, at [58]-[59], and Lord Reed, Neuberger and Mance in 
R (Buckinghamshire County Council) v Secretary of State for Transport [2014] 1 WLR 324, at 
[78] to [79] and [206] to 207.   
192 [2002] 1 CMLR 50.  
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conclusion reached, and a status ascribed to legislation by, the common law. ‘The 
ECA is, by force of the common law, a constitutional statute.’ Thus it is not for 
Parliament to intend that a statute be regarded as constitutional; it is for judges 
applying the principles of the common law to decide for themselves.193  
 
Similarly David Feldman wrote that the Divisional Court: 
 
mis-states the process by which a statute comes to be regarded as 
‘constitutional’.  As Laws L.J. made clear in Thoburn, a statutory provision is 
constitutional not because the legislature intended it to have that status (which in 
any case had not been recognized in law when the 1972 Act was passing through 
Parliament) but because the common law confers that status on it.  In other words, 
constitutional status is the result of what Parliament enacts, not an aspect of 
Parliament’s ‘intention’ in enacting it.194  
 
This criticism too was echoed in the Government’s printed case of appeal to the Supreme 
Court: 
 
‘the constitutional status of a statue is conferred by the common law (Thoburn at 
[69]) and not, as the [Divisional Court] suggested as a result of the intention of the 
legislature…’.195 
 
Thus critics of the Divisional Court judgment – and by implication of the similar assertions 
made by the majority in the Supreme Court - appear to assert that in identifying Parliament 
as having endowed the ECA with special constitutional status, the courts have erred: only 
the common law can do this. It is true that Laws LJ, in certain dicta in Thoburn - the case that 
                                                          
193 Mark Elliott and Hayley Hooper, ‘Critical reflections on the High Court’s judgment in R 
(Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union’ U.K. Const. L. Blog (7th Nov. 
2016).  
 
194  D. Feldman, ‘Brexit, the Royal Prerogative, and Parliamentary Sovereignty’ UK Const. L. 
Blog (8th Nov 2016). 
195  See note 63 above, Appendix, [2].  
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originated the ‘constitutional statute doctrine’ - asserted that this was something only the 
courts could do, not Parliament itself. At one point in the judgment he said that Parliament:  
cannot stipulate as to the manner and form of any subsequent legislation. It cannot 
stipulate against implied repeal any more than it can stipulate against express 
repeal…The British Parliament has not the authority to authorise any such thing. Being 
sovereign, it cannot abandon its sovereignty.196  
 
Thus critics who complain that aspects of Miller are incompatible with these dicta in 
Thoburn are right. The problem with their critique however, is that these dicta of Laws LJ are 
clearly wrong on this point (and have always been wrong). By ‘this point’ I mean not the 
judge’s assertion that the common law can bestow certain statutes with constitutional 
status but rather his assertion that only the courts can do this, while Parliament cannot. And 
recall that this is the only relevant point for present purposes: the critics are complaining 
that the courts in Miller wrongly asserted that Parliament itself had endowed the ECA with 
constitutional status. The criticism only remains valid if Laws LJ was right about this.  But 
there are several convincing reasons to believe he was wrong.  
First, his positive argument for the assertion rests on a false premise. He claims that 
Parliament can ‘no more stipulate against implied repeal [than]…it can stipulate against 
express repeal’, because, ‘being sovereign, [Parliament] cannot abandon its sovereignty.’ 
However the suggestion that the same reasons for holding Parliament unable to prevent 
express repeal of a statute also render it unable to prevent implied repeal does not 
withstand analysis.  Were Parliament able to choose any statute it wanted and render it un-
repealable by any means this would be an obvious and serious affront to democracy: any 
policy could be thus entrenched, frustrating attempts by a new government elected on a 
different manifesto to change it. In contrast, mere stipulation against implied repeal 
amounts only to a requirement of linguistic form —that is, a requirement that a future 
statute must use express words in order to undo a previous statute; and this amounts to no 
substantive restriction upon the freedom of action of a future Parliament. It is a moment’s 
work for a draftsman to insert such words into a statute. As Goldsworthy, in one of the most 
sophisticated defences of parliamentary sovereignty written, puts it, ‘a Parliament that can 
only effectively legislate if it uses a particular form of words, to ensure that its intentions are 
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unmistakeable, is still free to legislate whenever it wishes to do so’.197  Thus there are 
excellent democratic reasons for denying to Parliament the ability to set any one of its 
statutes in stone in perpetuity that simply do not apply to a mere requirement that a 
particular statute be subject only to express repeal. And in fact Laws LJ himself appears to 
accept in Thoburn that the suspension of implied repeal in relation to a given statute, or set 
of statutes ‘preserves the sovereignty of the legislature’ – which makes a nonsense of his 
suggestion that were Parliament to stipulate against implied repeal it would be 
‘abandon[ing] its sovereignty’.   
Second, the suggestion that Parliament ‘cannot’ protect one of its statutes from 
implied repeal, but that the courts can, is hard to take seriously. Given that implied repeal is 
a judge-made doctrine, it would give that doctrine an unheard-of status in common law as a 
rule that Parliament is uniquely legally unable to change. There is quite simply no 
authority198 and it appears to run wholly counter to the basics of Parliamentary sovereignty 
by elevating a common law rule (implied repeal) above statute when it is elementary that 
statute ranks higher than common law in the UK constitution. If the UK Parliament is 
sovereign, it appears a simple contradiction to argue that the courts, subordinate to 
Parliament precisely under that doctrine, can introduce a restriction of form, while 
Parliament itself cannot. While one could perhaps make the argument that no statute can 
be protected against implied repeal by any means, it is quite incoherent to argue that the 
courts can grant such protection but Parliament cannot.  
Thus the positive argument that Laws LJ makes for this proposition appears plainly 
contrary to basic principle. But more practically speaking it appears impossible to square 
with both the plain words of section 2(4) of the European Communities Act and the effect 
given to them by a unanimous House of Lords in Factortame. Section 2(4), by saying that 
any Act ‘to be passed’, that is, any future Act, must take effect ‘subject to’ the provisions of 
the 1972 Act, seemed to suggest that the courts must allow Community law – given effect in 
UK law by the 1972 Act- to prevail over subsequent Acts of Parliament. This was evidently 
an attempt to suspend the normal doctrine of implied repeal; instead of any later statute 
                                                          
197 J. Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy, (Oxford: OUP, 
1999), at 245. 
198 Ellen Street Estates v Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590, 597 certainly contains an 
(obiter) denial that Parliament can suspend the implied repeal of a particular statute, but 
not in the context of simultaneous assertions that the courts can do this.   
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which conflicted with EU law impliedly repealing it, such a later statute would have to be 
either ‘construed’, that is, interpreted so that it did not conflict with EU law, or if it could not 
be so interpreted, not be given effect (‘have effect subject to’). That this attempt was 
successful was shown by the unanimous finding of the House of Lords in Factortame Ltd v 
Secretary of State (No 2),199 that the later Merchant Shipping Act 1988 Act did not impliedly 
repeal the earlier ECA 1972, but rather was ‘set aside’ by virtue of the superior force of the 
ECA. And that superior force came directly from Parliament’s enacted intention, as 
expressed in s 2(4) of that Act. As Lord Bridge explained in Factortame (no 1), that provision: 
 
has precisely the same effect as if a section were incorporated in Part II of the Act of 
1988 which in terms enacted that the provisions with respect to registration of 
British fishing vessels were to be without prejudice to the directly enforceable [EU 
law] rights of nationals of any Member State of the [EU].200 
 
Thus the UK’s then top court found unanimously in two decisions that it was Parliament that 
had given EU law and the statute that gave it effect, the ECA, this special status, such that 
implied repeal was suspended. It is therefore somewhat remarkable that the obiter dicta 
assertion by a single judge in the High Court that Parliament cannot do such a thing was 
ever given credence. Whatever the common law can do, it is clear that 
Parliament can change the rule of implied repeal – and did so in the ECA. To the extent that 
obiter dicta in Thoburn suggest the contrary, they have always been simply mistaken. Hence 
they form no basis on which to ground criticism of Miller.   
 To summarise a long argument, the objection that it is perfectly permissible for the 
Executive to change the UK constitution simply because the UK constitution, unlike most 
others, has no formal process of constitutional change, has been found to be both simplistic 
and misleading. The UK in fact has well-developed constitutional doctrine designed to limit 
the ability of the Executive to override basic constitutional rights and principles – and Miller 
can be seen as simply another case in which this principle was applied. As Timothy Endicott 
– a strong critic of the decision in Miller - has put it: 
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 ‘In Britain, Parliament can change the constitution, and the courts can determine 
the law of the constitution, but it is the Government that must uphold the 
constitution.’201 
 
D. Conclusion on the ‘constitutional change’ argument 
 The above discussion sought to make two main arguments. First, the proposition 
that the Executive alone may not make major changes to the constitution should not be 
treated as a startling one when viewed in comparative perspective. The response that such 
an argument does not apply to the UK system was answered via consideration of existing 
doctrine whereby the courts have protected fundamental constitutional rights and 
principles from incursions by the Executive.  It was also pointed out, however that Miller 
itself did not amount to a free-standing use of the ‘constitutional change’ argument. It may 
be that academic debate on this subject results in a consensus that the constitutional 
change principle is best confined to situations like Miller itself: where it is part and parcel of 
an established ground of challenge – frustration of a statute and/or loss of statutory rights. 
But it would seem premature at this point to rule out the free-standing approach in all 
possible circumstances: further discussion is needed.  
VI. CONCLUSION  
 
The decision in favour of the claimants in Miller is seen by its supporters as resting in 
part on elementary principles of constitutional law that have not been doubted since the 
17th century. As explained above, apparent novelties or difficulties in the decision – treating 
EU law as new source of law, and denying the ability of the Executive unilaterally to make 
major changes to the UK constitution – are neither novel nor unsupported by principle, 
when placed in proper context. Undoubtedly part of the importance of Miller lay in the 
arguments that were rejected. The Supreme Court might have accepted as a general 
                                                          
201 Timothy Endicott, ‘Parliament and the Prerogative: From the Case of Proclamations to 
Miller’, Policy Exchange, 1 December 2016, available 
https://judicialpowerproject.org.uk/timothy-endicott-parliament-and-the-prerogative-from-
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proposition that the prerogative may take away even people’s ‘fundamental rights’,202 or 
that statutes giving effect to rights derived from international law can for that reason be 
assumed to be merely ‘subsidiary’ and liable to be rendered ‘spent’ through prerogative 
action. Had it done so, it could have caused real damage to the steady progress our public 
law has made over many years in bringing the prerogative – which I have described as ‘one 
of the central problems of the UK constitution’203 - under parliamentary and judicial control.  
But, as the Introduction to this article suggested, Miller also paid eloquent tribute to the 
deep transformative effect that EU law has had in the UK constitution. There may indeed be 
an irony in the fact that such tribute was paid only as the UK is set to leave the EU.204 
However, it is hoped that the principles laid down in Miller will continue to provide 
inspiration not only to Member States grappling with the role of EU law in their legal orders, 
but also to those dualist states seeking to articulate limitations to the use of Executive treaty 
powers where domestic law is affected. In that way – as in many others - the effects of the 
UK’s membership of the EU may live on.  
                                                          
202 As proposed by David Feldman, note 194, whose arguments were partly adopted by the 
Government: note 63 above at [56].   
203 Phillipson, note 32 above at 1064.   
204 Murkens, n 14 above at 696 who compares this to ‘Hegel’s famous remark about the owl 
of Minerva spreading her wings only with the falling of the dusk’: ibid.   
